The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause by Snow, Ned
BYU Law Review
Volume 2013 | Issue 2 Article 2
5-1-2013
The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause
Ned Snow
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 259 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2013/iss2/2
The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause 
Ned Snow* 
ABSTRACT 
The Constitution premises Congress's copyright power on promoting "the 
Progress of Science." The word Science therefore seems to define the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter. Modern courts and commentators have 
subscribed to an originalist view of Science, teaching that Science meant 
general knowledge at the time of the Framing. Under this interpretation, all 
subject matter may be copyrighted because expression about any subject 
increases society's store of general knowledge. Science, however, did not 
originally mean general knowledge. In this Article, I examine evidence 
surrounding the Copyright Clause and conclude that at the Framing of the 
Constitution, Science meant a system of knowledge that comprises distinct 
branches of study. This historically accurate meaning casts doubt on whether a 
distinct group of expression may be copyrighted-namely, expression that the 
First Amendment does not protect. I argue that the original meaning of Science 
cannot support a constitutional copyright of unprotected speech. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution's Copyright Clause limits the scope of 
copyright to works that "promote the Progress of Science." 1 The 
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). This statement that the 
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meaning of the term Science would thus seem important in 
determining the boundaries of copyright protection.2 To this end, 
modern courts apply a purportedly original meaning of Science-
general knowledge or learning. 3 Under this modern interpretation 
of the original meaning, if the content of expression adds to 
society's general store of knowledge, it is copyrightable.4 And 
because expression regarding any content adds to the general 
store of knowledge, this interpretation of Science extends 
copyright to all content. 5 Even libel, obscenity, and true threats 
Copyright Clause limits the scope of copyright to works that "promote the Progress of Science" 
is subject to disagreement. I address the different views on this issue in Part II.B.3. 
2. Hereinafter, when I refer to the meaning of the term Science in the Copyright Clause, 
I simply capitalize Science instead of italicizing it according to Chicago Manual of Style Rule 
7.58. I treat references to the term useful Arts in the same fashion. Alternatively, when I refer to 
a meaning of science that is not specific to the Copyright Clause, I do not capitalize science. 
3. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) ("The 'Progress of Science,' 
petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to 'the creation and spread of knowledge and 
learning."'); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (explaining the public benefit of 
copyright as "the proliferation of knowledge" which would "ensure[] the progress of science") 
(citation omitted); id. at 243 (Breyer, ]., dissenting) (explaining undisputed premise that by 
'"Science' ... the Framers meant learning or knowledge"). 
4. This conclusion is apparent from the absence of any constitutional content 
requirement for copyright protection. The modern Supreme Court has adopted only a 
constitutional requirement for originality relating to Science. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (199I) (describing originality as the "touchstone" and "very 
'premise of copyright law'") (citation omitted); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545, 546, 558 (1985) (explaining purpose of copyright as increasing "the 
harvest of knowledge" and declaring that "original works" provide the "seed and substance of 
this harvest"); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 15I, I56 (1975) ("[T]he 
ultimate aim [of copyright] is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity .... "). 
5. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4; Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 
604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that obscene content does not bar it from being 
copyrightable); jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Belcher v. 
Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, I088 (9th Cir. I973) (rejecting argument that false and fraudulent 
material could not receive copyright protection). 
In addition to courts, commentators have followed this interpretation. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM 
F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 123 (1994) ("The term 'science' as used in the 
Constitution refers to the eighteenth-century concept of learning and knowledge."); L. RAY 
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 48 
(1991) ("[T]he word science retains its eighteenth-century meaning of 'knowledge or 
learning."'); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 106 (2008) (describing overriding 
purpose of promoting the "progress of science" as "broadly understood to include all products of 
the mind"). 
That copyright lacks any content restriction does not imply that anything at all may be 
copyrighted. Other terms in the Copyright Clause still limit the scope of copyrightable works 
(e.g., Authors, Writings). See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346. Works must still be fixed in a tangible 
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add to the general store of knowledge; they accordingly would 
seem copyrightable. 6 
Or perhaps not. In the recent case of Wong v. Hard Drive Products, 
Inc., the plaintiff argued that copyright cannot exist in obscene 
works? The Won~ court ruled for the plaintiff, although it failed to 
issue an opinion. In the absence of that opinion, the case raises an 
interesting question: Does Science in the Copyright Clause 
encompass expression that the Free Speech Clause fails to protect? 
Recently, the Supreme Court in Golan v. Holder re-iterated the 
seeming truism that Science in the Copyright Clause meant 
knowledge or learning.9 Albeit in dicta, the Golan Court's statement 
reinforces the teaching that the original meaning of Science 
contemplates all possible content in copyright. 
This teaching lacks support from any scholarly examination of 
the history surrounding the Copyright Clause. Legal scholars and 
courts have never performed a thorough examination of Science's 
original meaning in the Constitution.10 They have passively accepted 
the conventional interpretation of general knowledge solely on the 
basis that it reflects the first entry for science in a 1 786 dictionary. 11 
medium and be original expression to be copyrightable. See id. 
6. See cases cited supra note 5. 
7. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 10-11, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 
No. 5-12-cv-00469-HRL (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012). 
8. See Stipulated judgment, Wong, No. 4-12-cv-00469-YGR (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2012). 
9. 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). 
10. Scholars usually take this definition as axiomatic, without questioning its historical 
accuracy. See discussion infra Part II.A (describing absence of analysis from authorities who have 
given conclusion on meaning of Science). 
11. Consider Justice Breyer's dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft. He explained the undisputed 
premise that by '"Science' ... the Framers meant learning or knowledge." 537 U.S. 186, 243 
(2003) (Breyer,].. dissenting). To support this claim, Justice Breyer cited to a commentator, 
Edward Walterscheid, who relied on the first entry for science in the 1786 edition of Dr. Samuel 
Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, where the definition of science is simply 
"knowledge." !d. (citing EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002) (citing 2 SAMUEL jOHNSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan et al., 7th ed. 1786))). 
Walterscheid further noted two other commentators who posited this same meaning, again 
based on Dr. Johnson's first entry for science. See WALTERSCHEID, supra, at 125-26 & n.46 (citing 
Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48]. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 5, 11-12 & 
n.l4 (1966); Giles S. Rich, PrinciplesofPatentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393,396 (1960)). 
As a sidenote, the commentators referenced in this footnote do not specify which edition 
of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary they rely on. See, e.g., WALTERSCHEID, supra, at 125-26 & n.46. 
Presumably, they would have relied on the 1786 edition, which is closest to the time of the 
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Yet dictionaries of that time listed entries in order of a word's 
development in meaning, so the first entry would have stated the 
most primitive meaning-not the most commonly used. 12 To be 
sure, the absence of scholarly scrutiny on this issue is remarkable, 
especially given its impact on the scope of copyright. 
This Article analyzes the original meaning of Science in the 
Copyright Clause. Based on evidence surrounding the Copyright 
Clause, the Article concludes that the conventional interpretation is 
anachronistically incorrect. The evidence suggests that neither the 
Framers nor the public of that time would have ever intended such a 
broad, and for all practical purposes, meaningless meaning of 
Science. 13 The text of the Constitution, writings of the Framers, 
colonial copyright statutes, case law proximate to the Framing, and 
initial copyright registration records all make clear that this 
conventional understanding of the original meaning of Science is 
wrong. 14 All indicate a very different meaning-a powerfully 
discriminating meaning-in the Copyright Clause. 
The evidence indicates that Science meant a system of knowledge 
comprising distinct branches of study. 15 To promote the Progress of 
Science, expression needed to promote that system of knowledge. 16 
For instance, a journal of lunar observations and an instructional 
book on administering medicines (both published in 1791) would 
have been viewed as promoting a branch of study, and so they 
accordingly were copyrighted. 17 By contrast, in 1790, the New York 
framing. In the end, though, it would not matter which edition they relied on given that the 
original 1755 edition lists the same entries for science. See 2 SAMUEL jOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, W. Strahan et al., 7th ed. 1755). 
12. Dr. johnson explained: 
In every word of extensive use, it was requisite to mark the progress of its meaning, 
and show by what gradations of intermediate sense it has passed from its primitive to 
its remote and accidental signification; so that every foregoing explanation should 
tend to that which follows, and the series be regularly concatenated from the first 
notion to the last. 
I jOHNSON, supra note 11, at preface page 6. See also discussion infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing four 
other entries found in Dr. johnson's Dictionary). 
13. See discussion infra Part III. 
14. See discussion infra Part III. 
15. See discussion infra Part III. 
16. See discussion infra Part lli.D.2. 
17. In 1791, William Waring registered the following book for federal copyright 
protection, entitled: 
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Magazine's monthly stories of seduction would not have been viewed 
as promoting a branch of study, and they accordingly were not 
copyrighted. 18 
This historical understanding of Science and its effect on 
copyright raises the question of whether courts should continue to 
view copyright as entirely content neutral. Certainly I do not propose 
a return to the 1790 views regarding which expressional content 
promotes fields of studies. Unlike in 1791, stories of seduction in 
today's New York Magazine should fall within the meaning of Science. 
Indeed, over the past two centuries American culture has come to 
embrace most subject matter as sufficiently valuable to be worthy of 
study. Yet one category of expression falls short-that which is 
unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. 19 Devoid of any value that 
would justify protecting its content from censorship, unprotected 
speech does not appear to promote Science as that term was 
originally understood in the Copyright Clause. Therefore, to the 
A JOURNAL FOR LUNAR OBSERVATIONS, BY WHICH THE CALCULATION OF 
LONGITUDE IS MUCH EXPEDITED; The MARINER being led through the 
Operation BY A regular printed Form in each Page, HAVING ONLY To fill the Blanks 
from the Nautical Almanac and proper Tables, as indicated by the leading Lines to the 
respective Numbers: CONTAINING ALSO, IN THE SAME PAGE, Blanks for 
calculating the LATITUDE from the MOON'S meridional Altitude. With Directions 
exemplified, &c. 
See jAMES GILREATH, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, at 5 Qames Gilreath ed. & 
Elizabeth Carter Wills compiler, 1987) (hereinafter FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS] 
(capitalization of words in title as originally registered). 
Also in 1791, Doctor Nathan Dorsey registered for federal copyright protection his book 
entitled: A NEW AND COMPLETE SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTIONS, FOR THE SAFE AND 
SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICINES, IN THOSE DISEASES INCIDENT TO 
MARINERS. See id. 
18. In 1790, the year that the first Federal Copyright Act became effective, the New York 
Magazine published in january a lurid story entitled, The Fatal Effects of Seduction. 1 N.Y. MAG. 22, 
22-23 (1790). The next month, it published a similar story that set forth acts of seduction, 
Edmund and Harriot. 1 N.Y. MAG. 86, 86-89, 137-39 (1790). In June, it followed up these earlier 
stories of seduction with, The Country Squires's Revenge. 1 N.Y. MAG. 354, 354-58 (1790). None of 
these stories, or the magazine publications, cited in note 18 are listed in the federal registration 
for copyright protection-a requirement at that time for protection. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT 
RECORDS, supra note 17, at 101-15; Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § 3 (requiring registration 
for copyright protection of publication). The decision not to copyright these stories lies with the 
authors or publishers-not any government body or institution. Hence, the decision not to 
copyright suggests an original public understanding of what was copyrightable and what was not. 
See infra note 68 (noting the scholarly approach to deriving the original meaning of words in the 
Constitution as an examination of the original public understanding). 
19. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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extent that courts continue to rely on the original meaning of 
Science, they should recognize that Science is inconsistent with 
copyrighting unprotected speech. 
This Article examines the original meaning of Science in the 
Copyright Clause and concludes that the meaning is inconsistent 
with copyrighting unprotected speech. Part II analyzes the modern 
interpretation of Science. It observes several irregularities and one 
fundamental error in the interpretive methodology of modern courts 
and scholars. Part III conducts an inquiry into the original meaning 
of Science in the Copyright Clause. It examines the legislative 
history surrounding the Clause, analyzes the text of the Clause itself, 
and observes evidence in the decades following the Constitution. 
Part III concludes that Science meant a system of knowledge that 
comprises, or derives from, branches of study. Part IV discusses the 
implications of this more accurate historical understanding. It argues 
that to the extent courts continue to rely on an original 
interpretation of the Copyright Clause, unprotected speech must lie 
outside the scope of copyright. 
II. THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE ORIGINAL MEANING 
Modern courts, Congresses, and commentators uniformly 
subscribe to a meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause that 
purports to reflect its original meaning at the Framing.20 That 
purported meaning is general knowledge or learning. 21 More 
precisely, authorities uniformly teach that Science at the Framing 
was synonymous with possessing knowledge about anything, or 
similarly, gaining knowledge about anything.22 According to the 
authorities, then, general knowledge or learning represents the 
original meaning of Science that presently governs the Copyright 
Clause.23 Yet as discussed below, this meaning admits irregularities 
in the hermeneutics of constitutional interpretation, which 
ultimately call into question the accuracy of the meaning. 
20. See discussion infra Part !I.A. 
21. See supra note 3. 
22. See supra notes 3-5, and 11. 
23. See discussion infra Part !I.A. 
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A. Authorities 
Many examples illustrate this modern understanding of the 
original meaning of Science. I give only a few. Modern courts treat 
this definition as axiomatic. Most recently in the 2012 majority 
opinion of Golan v. Holder, Justice Ginsburg referred to the meaning 
of Science as knowledge and learning. 24 In 2003, Justice Breyer in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft explained the meaning of Science as follows: 
"'Science'-by which word the Framers meant learning or 
knowledge .... "25 Lower courts have repeatedly articulated this 
understanding, beginning with the Federal Court of Claims in 1973, 
which declared that Science in the Copyright Clause "is used in the 
sense of general knowledge rather than the modern sense of physical 
or biological science."26 
Congressional understanding of Science seems to mirror that of 
the judiciary. Senate and House reports in 1952 address the scope of 
copyright protection under the Copyright Clause. Those reports both 
state: "[T]he word 'science' in this connection [has] the meaning of 
knowledge in general, which is one of its meanings today."27 Also 
indicative of congressional understanding is the current Copyright 
Act. The Act fails to impose a content-based limitation on the 
subject matter of copyright, which suggests an interpretation of 
Science that is broad and all-encompassing, consistent with general 
knowledge or learning. 28 
Leading copyright historians have subscribed to this original 
understanding of Science, although without offering a historical 
analysis. William Patry has explained that Science in the Copyright 
Clause refers to "the eighteenth-century concept of learning and 
24. 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). 
25. 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer,]., dissenting) (citing WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11, 
at 125-26). The majority in Eldred made similar statements in explaining that the public benefit 
of copyright was "the proliferation of knowledge," which would "ensure[] the progress of 
science." Id. at 212 n.18. 
26. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670,683 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd 
on other grounds, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affdbyequallydividedCourt, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); 
see also Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., 830 F. Supp. 614, 622 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1993) 
("[T]he use of the term 'science' [in the Copyright Clause] relates to copyrights and is generally 
given its eighteenth century meaning of knowledge or learning."). 
27. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 3 (1952). 
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this 
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... "). 
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knowledge."29 Ray Patterson has stated that in the Copyright Clause, 
"the word science retains its eighteenth-century meaning of 
'knowledge or learning."'3° Craig joyce, Dotan Oliar, Malia Pollack, 
and Edward Walterscheid-to name only a few-have all written 
that Science at the Framing meant knowledge or learning.31 
B. Interpretive Irregularities 
At first glance, the uniformity of this interpretation suggests its 
accuracy. If everyone has subscribed to the same view, it must be 
right. But on closer examination, the interpretation admits troubling 
irregularities. Taken together, these irregularities suggest problems 
with the uniform interpretation. They suggest a need for a 
comprehensive examination. This Section summarizes those 
irregularities. 
1. First-entry fallacy 
Where courts and commentators bother to cite authority for 
their interpretation that Science means general knowledge or 
learning, they most often rely on one particular source: Dr. Samuel 
Johnson's 1786 Dictionary of the English Language.32 In the Dictionary, 
Dr. Johnson em~loyed five entries to define science.33 The first entry 
is "knowledge." 4 If courts and commentators do not explicitly cite 
29. 1 PATRY, supra note 5, at 123. 
30. PATTERSON & LiNDBERG, supra note 5, at 48. 
31. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11, at 125 ("The use of the term 'science' [in the 
Copyright Clause] is straightforwardly explained by the fact that in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century 'science' was synonymous with 'knowledge' and 'learning."'); Ootan Oliar, 
Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's 
Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.j. 1771, 1809 (2006) ("[T]he eighteenth-century meaning of 
'science' was close to the meaning of 'knowledge."'); L. Ray Patterson & Craig joyce, Copyright in 
1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.j. 909, 947 (2003) (equating Science with 
learning and rejecting argument that Science imposes any sort of content-based restriction on 
the subject matter of copyright); Malia Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from 
Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 
36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 376 (2002) ('"Science' means 'knowledge' in an anachronistically 
broad sense."). 
32. See supra note 11. 
33. 1 jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated). 
34. !d. 
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the first entry, they implicitly must rely on it as support for their 
conclusion that Science meant general knowledge, for the other 
entries are narrower in meaning than knowledge.35 Other entries 
include "[c]ertainty grounded on demonstration"; "species of 
knowledge"; and " [ o] ne of the seven liberal arts."36 Only the first 
entry supports the all-encompassing interpretation of Science as 
general knowledge. Therefore, the first entry in Dr. Johnson's 
Dictionary, knowledge, appears to be the principal source for 
interpreting the original meaning of Science to be general 
knowledge. 
The problem with relying on this first entry in Dr. Johnson's 
Dictionary is that there is no reason to choose the first entry over any 
of the other entries. Presumably, courts and commentators rely on 
the first entry because a first entry often reflects the most common 
usage of a word. 37 At the Framing, however, lexicographers-
including Dr. Johnson-listed entries in order of their development 
in meaning-their chronological etymology-rather than any sort of 
usage pattern.38 So because Dr. Johnson listed five entries for 
science, the first entry-knowledge-represented the most primitive 
meaning at the Framing-not necessarily the most commonly-used 
meaning. Hence, courts and commentators have committed a 
rudimentary error in assuming that Dr. Johnson's first entry better 
reflects the meaning of Science at the Framing than does any of the 
other four entries.39 Simply put, they don't know how to read a 
dictionary-at least not one printed in 1786. 
35. See id. 
36. !d. 
37. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED, at 
xxxii (2d ed. 1987) ("[T]he most frequently encountered meaning generally comes before less 
common ones. Specialized senses follow those in the common vocabulary, and rare, archaic, and 
obsolete senses are listed last."). 
38. See 1 jOHNSON, supra note 11, at page 6 of preface; supra note 12. 
39. This interpretative error is, unsurprisingly, not the first instance where the Court has 
incorrectly inferred importance of meaning from ranking of order in a dictionary. See Stephen C. 
Mouritsen, Comment, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based 
Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1926-37 (analyzing fallacious reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), where the Court premised the 
importance or common usage of the meaning of the word carry on the fact that dictionaries listed 
a particular meaning as the first definition). 
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2. Widespread originalism 
The modern interpretation of Science is further irregular in that 
it reflects a uniform approach of originalism. Uniformly, everyone 
looks to the meaning of Science at the Framing. Such an originalist 
approach diverges from the interpretive process that courts and 
scholars have applied to arrive at meanings of other words in the 
Constitution. The process of evaluating constitutional policy in view 
of circumstances that have changed since the Framing has informed 
the meanings of searches and seizures, private property, commerce, 
due process, establishment, and speech-to name only a few.40 Why 
not Science? In short, the approach to interpreting Science 
represents an irregularity in that it fails to consider cultural 
differences in time and relevant policy.41 There is simply no 
argument in case law or the literature that today's changed 
circumstances or policy considerations require an evolution of 
meaning in the constitutional construction of Science. Instead, there 
is only one meaning that purportedly reflects the precise definition at 
the Framing. Science is irregular in the uniform application of 
originalism to arrive at its meaning. 
This observation suggests that the meaning of Science should 
perhaps reflect changing circumstances of society. Science may be a 
word that contemplates an evolutive meaning, or at least it may 
contemplate room for discussion on whether its boundaries might 
change. This Article, however, does not offer that discussion. I 
discuss that possibility elsewhere.42 Here, I merely observe the 
40. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 53, 63-65, 73-75 (1996) (discussing search and seizure); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 934, 969-81 (2000) (analyzing 
the constitutional meaning of property); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1-6, 15-
18 (2010) (discussing commerce); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the 
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2107-2110, 2131 (2003) 
(discussing establishment); David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1416, 1416-
20 (2005) (discussing the definition of speech); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the 
Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1082-90 (1984) (discussing due process). 
41. For an interesting account of the originalist and evolving approaches to constitutional 
interpretation, see Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 9-32 (1998). 
42. See Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to 
Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract=2212116. 
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irregularity: uniform originalism. To the extent, then, that courts 
and commentators continue to pursue an originalist approach, this 
Article offers evidence of the original meaning. 
That evidence is valuable in view of judicial and scholarly failure 
to conduct any sort of historical analysis of Science at the Framing. 
Most often they do not cite authority for the originalist 
interpretation that they offer. Where they do cite authority, that 
authority traces back to the first entry of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary, 
completely ignoring the other four entries. 43 There is no discussion 
of the cultural context surrounding Science at the Framing.44 Nor is 
43. With respect to Congress, the 1952 Senate and House report statement regarding the 
meaning of Science fails to cite any authority for its interpretation of Science as "knowledge in 
general." See supra note 27. With respect to the Supreme Court, other than the excerpt from 
Justice Breyer quoted in note 11 above, the Court has never cited any authority when it has 
equated Science with knowledge or learning. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 
(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003). Justice Breyer's sole citation was to 
one commentator, Edward Walterscheid, for his interpretation of Science at the Framing. See 
supra note 11. 
Commentators' interpretation of Science at the Framing is equally lacking. The extent of 
historical support in the literature for the proposition that Science means general knowledge or 
learning may be summarized in the citation by Edward Walterscheid, who cited to three sources 
as support for his one-sentence analysis of the original meaning of Science: 
(1) Dr. Johnson's Dictionary published in the latter 1700s; 
(2) a 1966 law review article by Arthur Seidel, who reached this same interpretation in 
three sentences, and for support, cited to Dr. Johnson's Dictionary definition for science, as well 
as one usage by Thomas Jefferson and one usage by Lord Coke (neither of whom were present at 
the Constitutional Convention), see Seidel, supra note 11, at 11-12 & n.14; and 
(3) a 1962 law review article by Judge Giles Rich, who in less than one page interpreted 
Science to have originally meant "knowledge in any field," relying exclusively on Dr. Johnson's 
Dictionary for this interpretation. See Rich, supra note 11, at 396. 
44. A scholar of science history, Professor Bernard Cohen, performed a comprehensive 
examination of science's effect on the Framers in his book Science and the Founding Fathers. In that 
book, he spent three pages analyzing the meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. See I. 
BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 306-08 (1995). His analysis appears 
cogent and consistent with the conclusions of this Article. Part of his ultimate conclusion, 
however, lacks support. He concluded that Science meant "theoretical or general principles of 
practice that are associated directly with useful inventions or that lead to economic benefits or 
financial rewards." Id. at 308 (emphasis added). Certainly Science as "theoretical or general 
principles of practice" is consistent with this Article's conclusion on the meaning of science. See 
discussion infra Part III. But his conclusion that Science is directly associated with "economic 
benefit" or "financial rewards" finds no support in either his analysis or this Article. 
Nevertheless, the main point of Cohen's conclusion, which he made explicit, is that Science in 
the Copyright Clause would have had a much narrower meaning than the broadest possible 
definition of that time. See CoHEN, supra, at 308. This conclusion essentially contravenes the 
modern interpretation of courts and commentators. One commentator, Edward Walterscheid, 
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there discussion of the legislative history surrounding the Copyright 
Clause. Nor any textual analysis of the Clause itself.45 Simply put, 
the purportedly originalist interpretation of Science fails to draw 
support from any rigorous historical inquiry. 
3. Lack of meaning 
The modern interpretation of the original meaning of Science 
presents an additional irregularity in that it implies the absence of 
meaning. A bedrock principle of constitutional interpretation is that 
words should be construed so that they convey practical, effective 
meaning rather than impotent surplusage.46 To have meaning, words 
should discriminate by setting the boundaries of their subject 
matter. Yet an interpretation of Science that means general 
knowledge or learning fails to set those boundaries in the context of 
defining the purpose and scope of the copyright power. Any subject 
matter may be known or learned. Indeed, even expressions of fraud, 
obscenity, and terrorism give rise to knowledge and learning. So by 
encompassing anything that can be known or learned, Science 
encompasses everything. It discriminates against nothing. And an 
disagreed with Cohen's conclusion, contending that Cohen was attempting to "read the 
copyright provision out of the clause." WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11, at 130. Yet Walterscheid 
failed to cite any contrary evidence that Cohen's conclusion was incorrect. See id. Indeed, the 
only reason that Walterscheid cited as a basis for disagreeing with Cohen was the fact that 
Cohen's conclusion was "obviously at odds with the usual judicial interpretation." Id. 
45. I do recognize, however, that one legal scholar did perform a historical inquiry of 
sorts. Professor Solum derived a meaning from the Oxford English Dictionary, the 1790 
Copyright Act, and one early case that considered its meaning. See Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's 
Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 47-53 (2002) 
(concluding that the original meaning of Science was "systematic knowledge or learning of 
enduring value"). Yet although he performed an admirable historical analysis, it was secondary 
to the primary focus of his article, which argues against retroactive term extension of copyright 
law. See id. at 3-4. Much more can be explored and analyzed that sheds further light on the 
meaning of Science. See also Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 421, 458 (2009) (contemplating briefly that Science could have meant either 
"useful knowledge," "knowledge," or "learning"). 
46. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) ("When interpreting the 
Constitution, we begin with the unremarkable presumption that every word in the document 
has independent meaning, 'that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added."') 
(quoting Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938)); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 
570-71 (1840) ("In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its 
due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word 
was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added."). 
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interpretation that leaves words without meaning-without 
discriminatory force-is irregular in constitutional hermeneutics. 
Of course this irregularity would not raise concern if the phrase 
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" (the Progress 
Clause) were merely preambular in nature.47 If the Progress Clause 
were preambular, the meaning of Science becomes irrelevant. As a 
preamble, the Progress Clause would not affect the scope of power 
granted to Congress. 48 Hence, Science as meaningless surplusage 
would not raise concern if the Clause itself represents meaningless 
surplusage-a preamble. 
Some argue that the Progress Clause represents just that-a 
preamble of no effect on the grant of Congress's copyright power.49 I 
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). 
48. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577-78 (2008) ("(A] prefatory clause 
does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause."). 
49. See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 1.03(A] at 
1-91 (2010) ("(T]he phrase 'To promote the progress of science and useful arts .. .' must be 
read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power but not in 
limitation of its exercise.''); Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths 
Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 299 (2002) 
(construing the phrase, promote the Progress of Science, as indicating mere purpose without any 
limiting force on the actual power). Three federal circuits have adopted this view. See Eldred v. 
Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument "that the introductory 
language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power") (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 
128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985) ("We agree with Professor Nimmer that although the promotion of 
artistic and scientific creativity and the benefits flowing therefrom to the public are purposes of 
the Copyright Clause, those purposes do not limit Congress's power to legislate in the field of 
copyright."); Ladd v. Law & Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1985) (reciting its 
precedent as relying on Nimmer for the proposition that "the first phrase of the Copyright 
Clause expands rather than limits congressional authority"). The Supreme Court has employed 
language suggesting that the Progress Clause limits congressional authority. See Graham v. john 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1966) ("The [Intellectual Property] Clause is both a grant of power 
and a limitation .... Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the 
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.''). On the other hand, most recently in 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012), the Court re-iterated its position that individual 
elements of a copyright regime need not "operate to induce new works" in accordance with the 
Copyright Clause, but rather the regime as a whole should serve the ends of the Clause, 
suggesting that the limiting force of the Progress Clause is weak. Compare Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 
("[W]e have described the Copyright Clause as 'both a grant of power and a limitation,' and 
have said that the primary objective of copyright is to promote the Progress of Science.") 
(quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-8) with id. at 211 ("[P]etitioners do not argue that the Clause's 
preamble is an independently enforceable limit on Congress' power."). 
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disagree. As an initial matter, I observe that the very presence of 
Science suggests that it is necessary in defining the grant of 
copyright power. 5° Certainly the Framers could have given Congress 
the power to legislate copyright without mentioning Science had 
they believed that copyright would promote Science as a matter of 
course. But they did mention Science. And the presence of a word in 
the Constitution presumptively suggests that the word is 
necessary. 51 Furthermore, nothing in the text of the Copyright 
Clause or the history surrounding that Clause suggests that Science 
should be construed as superfluous. As a necessary term, Science 
must define the grant. Its meaning must matter. 
I further observe that interpretive consistency in the Intellectual 
Property Clause suggests that the Progress Clause is not preambular. 
The Intellectual Property Clause consists of dual grants of power, 
i.e., copyright and patent, in the single clause. 52 The word Science 
has been interpreted as applying to copyright and useful Arts to 
patent. 53 On the patent side, courts have treated useful Arts as a 
50. See Edward C. Walterscheid, "Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant": Constitutional 
Limitatiom on the Patent Power, 9 j. INTELL. PROP. L. 291, 326 (2002) (arguing against construing 
the Progress Clause as preambular in nature because to do so would "render it meaningless," 
which effect would be contrary to a well-established principle of constitutional interpretation). 
51. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect."). Cf. Heller, 554 
U.S. at 578 n.3 (concluding that a clause should be construed as prefatory rather than operative 
where "the text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as 
'whereas' clauses in federal legislation or the Constitution's preamble"). 
52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). 
53. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 ("Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader, 
Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the 
progress of the useful arts."); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-93 ('The Copyright and Patent Clause, 
U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: 'Congress shall have Power ... [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times the 
exclusive Right to their ... Writings."') (ellipses in original); Graham, 383 U.S. at 5 ("[T]he 
federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the 
Congress 'To promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries."') (ellipses in original); WALTERSCHEID, 
supra note 11, at 116-18 (linking Science with copyright and useful Arts with patent); Solum, supra 
note 45, at 12 ("[T]he structure of the Clause and its history of exposition makes clear the 
parallel structure that associates 'Science,' 'Authors,' and 'Writings' with the copyright power."). 
This is not to say, however, that Science does not inform the patent power. See Oliar, supra note 
45 at, 468-67. 
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limiting term. 54 The Court has explained in Graham v. john Deere Co. 
that the phrase "promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts" exists as 
a constitutional standard that "may not be ignored" and controls 
patent validity.55 So on the patent side of the Progress Clause, the 
Court has indicated that the Clause limits the scope of patent. It 
would therefore be inconsistent to interpret the copyright side of the 
Progress Clause-i.e., that relating to Science-as preambular.56 To 
the extent that the term useful Arts requires utility or 
nonobviousness in patents, interpretive consistency would mandate 
that Science not be construed as a preambular introduction. 
These observations of the Progress Clause are of course only 
cursory in nature, and thereby insufficient to definitively establish 
that the Progress Clause is not preambular. Yet others have 
persuasively and exhaustively argued against construing that Clause 
as a preamble, and I rely on their work.57 They have argued that the 
Framers intended the Progress Clause as an actual grant of power to 
Congress, with copyright serving as the designated means for 
exercising that power. 58 Professor Lawrence Solum has reached this 
conclusion based on a thorough examination of the grammatical 
structure of the Clause in relation to all the powers granted to 
Congress under Article I Section 8. 59 His argument is that every 
other power in Section 8 grants a power in the first clause beginning 
54. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 ("The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may 
not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.") (describing the 
patent law as a "system which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of ... 
useful Arts"') (ellipses in original); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) ("The utility requirement has its origin in article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which 
indicates that the purpose of empowering Congress to authorize the granting of patent is 'to 
promote the progress of . . . useful arts.'"). 
55. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 ("This [the phrase 'promote the Progress of ... useful Arts'] 
is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light 
that patent validity 'requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution."') (internal 
citation omitted). 
56. Cf Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright 
Power, 9 MARQ. lNTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307, 318 (2005) ("Early on, the phrase was interpreted as a 
limitation on both the patent power and the copyright power; while in the modern era it remains 
a limitation on the patent power, but has not been treated as an equivalent limitation on the 
copyright power.''). 
57. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1810-16; Solum, supra note 45, at 12-25. See also Snow, 
supra note 42. 
58. See sources cited supra note 57. 
59. See Solum, supra note 45, at 12-25. 
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with "To," and so the Copyright Clause should not be construed 
differently. 60 He rejected the contention that the Progress Clause 
could be construed as a preambular introduction of the actual 
copyright power, calling the argument "simply unsustainable."61 
Similarly, Professor Dotan Oliar has concluded that the Framers 
intended the Progress Clause to be a limitation on Congress's 
copyright power. 62 His analysis has a historical focus, examining the 
textual transition from initial proposals at the Convention to the 
ultimate language in the Copyright Clause, as well as the political 
context of the time. 63 
I agree with the ultimate conclusion of both Professors Solum 
and Oliar: the Progress Clause is not preambular in nature.64 I 
further observe that if the Progress Clause is a grant of power, the 
word Science must define that grant, and by defining the grant, 
Science must set boundaries on the grant. This conclusion draws 
persuasive support from Professor Oliar's historical work, where he 
argues that the Progress Clause limits congressional authority. 65 I 
therefore rely on the evidence and arguments of Professor Oliar for 
60. See id. 
61. Id. at 22-23 ("The erroneously labeled 'preamble' is actually the legally operative 
grant of power."). 
62. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1810-16. 
63. See id. at 1771. 
64. Modern jurisprudence of the Supreme Court does not definitively address the issue of 
whether the Science Clause represents a limitation on congressional power or, alternatively, a 
nonlimiting preamble. In Graham v.john Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, S-8 (1966), the Court explained in 
a patent case that "[t]he [Intellectual Property] Clause is both a grant of power and a limitation 
. . . . Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by 
the stated constitutional purpose." This language suggests that the Court would view the 
Science Clause as a limitation. The Court re-iterated this rhetoric in Eldred v. Ashcroft. 53 7 U.S. 
186, 212 (2003) ("[W]e have described the Copyright Clause as both a grant of power and a 
limitation, and have said that the primary objective of copyright is to promote the Progress of 
Science.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet also in Eldred, the Court 
employed language suggesting that the Science Clause might not be a limitation: "petitioners do 
not argue that the Clause's preamble is an independently enforceable limit on Congress' power." 
Id. at 211; cf Oliar, supra note 31, at 1831 (pointing out that because the petitioners conceded 
the issue, the Court in Eldred did not decide whether the Progress Clause limits congressional 
authority). 
The Court made a statement in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008) that 
might suggest its viewpoint on this issue. The Heller Court described the structure of the Second 
Amendment as a division between an initial preambular clause and a subsequent operative 
clause; that division, the Court stated, "is unique in our Constitution." Id. (emphasis added). 
65. Oliar, supra note 45, passim; Oliar, supra note 31, passim. 
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the proposition that the Progress Clause limits the scope of 
congressional authority. Based on this premise, the meaning of 
Science would affect the scope of congressional power to legislate 
copyright. 66 
Thus, as a word that defines the scope of congressional power, 
Science must have meaning. Yet as noted above, interpreting Science 
to mean general knowledge or learning would fail to impose any 
practical effect on the congressional power. That interpretation 
would leave the term meaningless in the Clause, offending the 
normal cannons of constitutional interpretation. 
III. THE MEANING OF SCIENCE AT THE FRAMING 
These interpretive irregularities suggest a need to re-visit the 
original meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. This need 
extends beyond insulated academic circles, for the Supreme Court 
routinely relies on historical evidence in construing copyright law.67 
This Part therefore examines several pieces of evidence to arrive at 
the likely meaning of Science at the time of the Framing. It explores 
the following: evidence of the general meaning of science at the 
Framing (not specific to the Copyright Clause); the proposals for a 
copyright power at the Constitutional Convention; textual 
connotations implied by the verbiage of the Copyright Clause; the 
first Copyright Act enacted in 1790; public records of copyright 
registration during the decade following that Act; and an opinion of 
an early Supreme Court Justice regarding the limitation of Science in 
the Copyright Clause. 
66. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1771. Related to this issue of whether the Progress Clause 
is a preamble or a limitation is the issue of whether the Progress Clause applies to individual 
works, or alternatively, only to the overall statutory regime of the Copyright Act. This related 
issue I address in another work, and I conclude that the Progress Clause should apply to 
individual works. See Snow, supra note 42. 
67. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) ("[T]he Framers regarded 
copyright protection not simply as a limit on the manner in which expressive works may be 
used. They also saw copyright as an engine of free expression.") (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213-14 (looking to the practice of Congress "since the founding 
generation" to determine legitimacy of retroactive extension of copyright term); Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994) (relying on views of centuries-old jurists, 
justice Story and Lord Ellen borough, to craft modern fair use doctrine); Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (reciting view of Framers in 
applying fair use). 
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These pieces of evidence indicate that the meaning of Science in 
the Copyright Clause was narrower than the conventional 
interpretation of general knowledge or learning. 68 The evidence 
indicates that Science meant a system of knowledge that comprises 
or derives from distinct branches of study. 
A. A General Understanding of Science 
The common understanding of science at the time of the 
Framing provides a starting point for understanding the specific 
meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. This Section examines 
the meaning of science in both its historical context of the 
Enlightenment and as portrayed by one of the most well recognized 
lexicographers of the time, Dr. Samuel johnson. 
1. The Enlightenment 
In a general sense, science at the Framing encompassed the tools 
of reason and experience, both of which had given rise to the 
Enlightenment. 69 Through science, reason and experience had 
yielded an organized method for understanding existence from 
68. In examining the original meaning, I seek the likely public understanding of the word 
as used in the Constitution at the time of its ratification, rather than the original intent that the 
Framers may have had by including the word in the Constitution-although the latter intent 
may inform the former understanding. As between the original public understanding and the 
original intent of the Framers, the former represents the prevailing approach to an original 
textual analysis of the Constitution. See generally Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 9 I GEO. L.J. 1I 13, I !3 I (2003) 
(introducing constitutional theory of '"originalist' textualism" as "faithful application of the 
words and phrases of the text in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the time 
they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted the text as 
law"); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and 
the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295, 1307 
(2009) (quoting Kesavan & Paulsen, supra, at 1132) (setting forth a constitutional interpretive 
theory that requires an understanding of "how the words and phrases, and structure ... would 
have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader of those 
words and phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political and 
linguistic community in which they were adopted"); Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and 
Executive Privilege, 88 TEX. L. REV. 301, 323 n.143 (2009). Although I agree with the original-
public-meaning approach, I draw upon resources indicating original intent in addition to those 
that directly address original public meaning because the intent is relevant to the likely original 
public understanding. 
69. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 60. 
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various perspectives. 70 Science unfolded the success of Francis Bacon 
in exploring the power of empirical thought; Isaac Newton in 
achieving an unsurpassable understanding of physics, natural 
philosophy, and mathematics; and Carl Linnaeus in developing an 
unheralded system of biological taxonomy. 71 Many more-Rene 
Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and George Berkeley to name only a 
few-had similarly achieved powerful explanatory theories relating 
to different aspects of existence, all through the scientific tools of 
reason and experience. 72 At the time of the Framing, science 
represented the common trait of Enlightenment achievements-the 
process that would draw upon reason and experience to explain 
existence. Science yielded the Enlightenment. 
The aspects of existence that science could explain at the 
Framing were not limited to the fields of nature and physics. Science 
at the Framing would have included subjects that dealt with human 
motives and interactions. 73 That is to say, the explanatory power of 
reason and experience in science would have been understood to be 
capable of explaining existence from any perspective?4 Science could 
explain morality, government, and history just as well as it could 
physics, biology, or botany. 75 Its general understanding would have 
included the moral and ethical philosophies of Immanuel Kant as 
well as the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
The same processes of reason and experience informed both the 
natural and the social subjects of science. 76 Insofar as reason and 
experience employed an organized methodology for explaining some 
aspect of existence, then, science was unbounded. 77 
70. CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 130-31 (1953). For an interesting 
summary of the influence of science at the time of the Framing, see Mark R. Killen beck, The 
Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. I, 41-49 (2002). 
71. See Killenbeck, supra note 70, at 41-49; COHEN, supra note 44, at 45-49, 57, 114-20, 
147. 
72. See generally S. MORRIS ENGEL, ANGEL!KA SOLDAN & KEVIN DURAND, THE STUDY OF 
PHILOSOPHY (6th ed. 2008). 
73. See RossiTER, supra note 70, at 440-41. For instance, Thomas jefferson wrote in a 
1799 letter: "government, religion, morality and every other science." Seidel, supra note 11, at 12 
n.15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 20 ("[T]he American nation was conceived in a historical 
period that is generally known as the Enlightenment, or the great Age of Reason, and science 
was then esteemed as the highest expression of human rationality."). 
75. See ROSSITER, supra note 70, at 130-31. 
76. See id. at 130, 133. 
77. Relevant to the formation of the new government, influential thinkers at the time of 
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Through the tools of reason and experience, science had yielded 
a culture of liberty and freedom at the Framing. 78 In effect, the new 
nation was built on reason and experience-a republic of science. 79 
the Framing would employ scientific analogies to argue their positions on government structure 
and policies. Consider a few examples. John Adams recognized the argument of James 
Harrington regarding the similarity between political balance and biological life sciences: 
Harrington argued that a bicameral legislature was like the two ventricles of the heart, each 
legislative house performing different functions like each ventricle of the heart. COHEN, supra 
note 44, at 21, 25, 218. James Wilson noted similarity between the common law and Newtonian 
physics, characterizing both as the "law of experience." I d. at 38 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). james Wilson believed that "[t]he cultivation & improvement of the human mind was 
the most noble object" of government and society. l THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
of 1787 605 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS] (quoting Wilson at constitutional 
convention). Thomas jefferson relied on principles of Newtonian physics in drafting the 
Declaration of Independence. COHEN, supra note 44, at 116-22 (arguing that phrases in the 
Declaration of Independence, such as "laws of nature" and "self-evident," allude to principles of 
Newtonian physics) (internal quotation marks omitted). Madison and Hamilton employed 
scientific analogies throughout the Federalist Papers. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 Qames 
Madison) Qacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (comparing liberty and faction to air and fire); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 14, supra, at 87 (comparing states at the frontier to body parts farthest from the 
heart that circulates blood); THE FEDERALIST No. 38, supra, at 242-43 (comparing the fragility of 
America to a sick patient). Benjamin Franklin recognized the similarity between the scientific 
method and democratic procedure, observing that both required pragmatism, free exchange of 
ideas, and free inquiry. See RossiTER, supra note 70, at 133, 285-86. Such instances of scientific 
metaphors in political writings suggest the value that the Framers placed on the explanatory 
power of reason and experience as manifest in natural sciences while debating the social science 
of government. 
78. See COHEN, supra note 44, at 57. George Washington explained the connection 
between science, knowledge, and liberty when he addressed the Senate in 1790: 
(T]here is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion of 
science and literature. Knowledge is, in every country, the surest basis of public 
happiness .... To the security of a free constitution it contributes ... by teaching 
the people themselves . . . to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that of 
licentiousness, cherishing the first, avoiding the last, and uniting a speedy but 
temperate vigilance against encroachments, with an inviolable respect to the laws. 
First Congress, Second Section: President Washington's Address, in LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS 1789-1904, at 115-16 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 1905). 
79. Thomas jefferson wrote: "Science had liberated the ideas of those who read and 
reflect, and the American example had kindled feelings of right in the people. An insurrection 
has consequently begun, of science, talents and courage against rank and birth, which have fallen 
into contempt." Letter from Thomas jefferson to john Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 2 THE ADAMS-
jEFFERSON LETTERS 391 (Lester]. Cappon ed., 1959). 
Jefferson similarly wrote: 
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light 
of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of 
mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few, booted 
and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman Qune 24, 1826), in THE jEFFERSONIAN 
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Given the role of science in the new democracy, it is unsurprising 
that the Framers felt obligated to continue its proliferation. 80 Science 
had gotten them where they were, and so its continued vitality 
would seem essential to holding their course. They chose copyright 
to fulfill that end. 81 
CYCLOPEDIA 245 Gohn P. Foleyed., 1900). 
And finally: 
We have spent the prime of our lives in [granting young men] the precious blessing 
of liberty. Let them spend theirs in shewing that it is the great parent of science and 
of virtue; and that a nation will be great in both always in proportion as it is free. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Willard (Mar. 24, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
jEFFERSON 699 Gulian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
80. See ROSSITER, supra note 70, at 130 ("Science and its philosophical corollaries were 
perhaps the most important intellectual force shaping the destiny of eighteenth-century 
America, and the men of America were quick to acknowledge and eager to repay the debt."). 
81. Why did the Framers choose copyright? The answer to this question indirectly 
informs the meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause. Instrumental reasons that the Framers 
likely would have understood for enacting copyright laws at that time suggest the effects that the 
Framers would have expected copyright to yield, which presumably mirrors the effects that they 
would have expected the Copyright Clause to yield, i.e., the promotion of Science. Hence, an 
examination into the reasons for enacting copyright laws in colonial America might suggest 
contours that the Framers contemplated for Science in the Clause. That examination would 
include instrumental reasons set forth in colonial copyright statutes and instrumental reasons 
propounded by individual copyright advocates of that time. I briefly analyze these sources below. 
Copyright Statutes 
Reasons for enacting copyright laws at the time of the Framing are found in individual 
state copyright statutes. Between 1783 and 1786, twelve of the thirteen states had enacted 
copyright laws. See Copyright Acts of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, New 
York, in COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 1 COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAW PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 
1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 1-21 (1973) (hereinafter COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS]. Delaware was 
the only state that did not pass a copyright statute. See COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra, at 21. 
The Framers were likely aware of these statutes, especially given that two members of the 
constitutional committee that drafted the Copyright Clause-James Madison and Abraham 
Baldwin-were themselves involved in passing their own states' copyright statutes. See E. 
MERTON COULTER, ABRAHAM BALDWIN: PATRIOT, EDUCATOR, AND FOUNDING FATHER 43-44 
(1987) (reciting history of Baldwin); infra note 108 and accompanying text. Of the twelve 
statutes, eleven cited or alluded to instrumental reasons for enacting copyright protection. See 
state copyright statutes of all but Virginia in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra, at 1-21. Those 
statutes' reasons reveal two common themes-scholastic learning and improvement of 
knowledge. 
Among the state copyright statutes, the theme of learning in a scholastic or educational 
sense is perhaps the most prevalent. Several states emphasized learning as a benefit of copyright 
with respect to the sort of learning that a learned person has experienced, i.e., scholastic or 
educational attainment. See Copyright Acts of Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island in COPYRIGHT 
ENACTMENTS, supra, at 2-21. Referring to a person as learned indicates that that person has 
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gained knowledge through study, not that the person has merely perceived a lot of information. 
Were it otherwise, all persons who have lived sufficiently long to perceive a lot of information 
would be considered learned. Hence, statutes that refer to copyright as existing to encourage the 
activity of learned persons suggest the sort oflearning that is scholastic or educational. 
References to this sort of learning are present in ten state copyright statutes. Connecticut, 
Georgia, and New York each explained that copyright encourages men or persons "of learning 
and genius to publish their writings." !d. at 1, 17, 19 (emphasis added). Massachusetts and 
Rhode Island likewise linked copyright with "the efforts of learned and ingenious persons"; and, 
similarly, New Hampshire linked copyright with "efforts of ingenious persons." Id. at 4, 8, 9 
(emphasis added). Maryland portrayed the purpose of copyright as "for the encouragement of 
learned men," and Pennsylvania similarly portrayed copyright as "for the encouragement of 
learned men to compose and write useful books." Id. at 5, 10 (emphasis added). New jersey 
placed perhaps the greatest emphasis on this sort of learning: "[L]earning tends to the 
embellishment of human nature, the honour of the nation, and the general good of 
mankind . . .. (M] en of learning who devote their time and talents to the preparing treatises for 
publication, should have the profits that may arise from the sale of their works . . . ." Id. at 6-
7 (emphases added). And although North Carolina never included the word learning in its 
statute, it cited the closely related synonym, genius, as a product of copyright. Id. at 15. Thus, 
learning in the scholastic or educational sense represented a prevalent theme throughout state 
copyright statutes-referred to in ten of the twelve statutes as an instrumental reason for 
copyright. 
Knowledge also was a common theme among the state statutes. But not just any sort of 
knowledge. Specifically, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island cited the improvement 
of knowledge as a reason for copyright, and North Carolina cited knowledge that was useful. Id. 
at 4, 8, 9, 15. None of the statutes referred to knowledge generally; all references to knowledge 
were qualified accordingly. Thus, four state copyright statutes cited the improvement of 
knowledge or the facilitation of useful knowledge as an instrumental reason for copyright. 
Although the statutes included other instrumental reasons for copyright, most of those 
other reasons represented direct effects of the sort of learning and knowledge discussed above-
e.g., the production of literature; the progress of civilization; the public weal of the community; 
the advancement of human happiness; and the promotion of useful discoveries. Only one 
instrumental reason listed in only one state statute appears less connected to learning and 
knowledge, and that is the promotion of commerce. North Carolina mentions commerce as a 
benefit of copyright, but tellingly, it describes commerce as merely a "general extension" of 
copyright, or in other words, an indirect benefit. See id. at 15. Hence, the fact that commerce 
appears in only one of the twelve statutes, coupled with the fact that the one statute that does 
cite commerce expressly qualifies its connection to copyright, suggests that commercial 
enterprise would not normally be associated with a benefit of copyright at the time of the 
Framing. Stated another way, copyright would not likely be thought of as a means to produce 
any sort of expression that would promote commerce. 
Therefore, to the extent that the Framers construed instrumental reasons for enacting 
copyright law at the state level as corresponding with the stated reason for including copyright 
in the Constitution-promoting science-science would seem to encompass the two common 
themes of the state statutes: educational or scholastic learning and improved or useful 
knowledge. 
Copyright Advocates 
Consistent with these two themes found in the state copyright statutes are arguments of 
copyright advocates in colonial America. In 1782, during the Revolutionary War, Thomas Paine 
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2. The 1786 dictionary 
Consistent with the Enlightenment's focus on reason and 
experience, dictionaries of the time shed further light on the public's 
general understanding of science. 82 Arguably the most authoritative 
dictionary at the Framing was Dr. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the 
addressed the issue of statutory copyright protection in his Letter to the Abbe Raynal. THE LIFE 
AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE: ESSAYS, LETTERS, ADDRESSES 182 (Daniel Edwin Wheeler ed., 
1908). He argued that literature would never flourish if not protected by copyright, and that 
even though England and America were at war, literature was not "entitled to depredation." Id. 
In a footnote to that comment, Paine explained: 
[W]hen peace shall give time and opportunity for study, the country will deprive itself 
of the honor and service of letters and the improvement of science, unless sufficient 
laws are made to prevent depredations on literary property. It is well worth 
remarking, that Russia, who but a few years ago was scarcely known in Europe, owes 
a large share of her present greatness to the close attention she has paid, and the wise 
encouragement she has given, to every branch of science and learning . . . . 
Id. at 182-83. Copyright, as Paine observed, would allow for "service of letters" and 
"improvement of science." Id. Copyright, he concluded, would serve as a means for "wise 
encouragement" of "every branch of science." Id. at 183. 
Perhaps the most influential advocate for enacting copyright laws in individual states was 
Noah Webster. See HARRY R. WARFEL, NOAH WEBSTER: SCHOOLMASTER TO AMERICA 53-59 
(1966); FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xviii. He argued that copyright 
proliferates useful knowledge for all citizens, and that this result was desirable to ensure a 
successful democracy rather than a failed experiment in government. Id. Webster viewed 
copyright as necessary for successful self-governance. 
Another influential advocate for copyright was Joel Barlow. Barlow wrote the Continental 
Congress seeking copyright legislation, and his letter ended up in the hands of two members of 
that Congress-James Madison and Hugh Williamson-who later served on the constitutional 
committee that drafted the Copyright Clause. Id. at xviii, xix. In that letter to the Continental 
Congress, Barlow recognized a connection between copyright and "the sciences." Letter from 
Barlow to Boudinot Qan. 10, 1783), in PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, item 78, 4:369-
70 (emphasis added). He argued that copyright was necessary in America because America 
lacked an aristocracy, which in the European countries had enabled persons to devote their lives 
to study. See id. Barlow thus viewed copyright as promoting the sciences in America because 
copyright created an incentive, necessary in America, for the sort of studying that was performed 
over a lifetime. See id. 
Thus, instrumental reasons for copyright at the time of the Framing suggest a meaning 
that the Framers would have expected from Science in the Copyright Clause. The state statutes 
suggest that the meaning would be consistent with improvement of knowledge or useful 
knowledge and learning that is scholastic or educational; the arguments of copyright advocates 
suggest a meaning that is consistent with knowledge that enables self-governance and 
knowledge that would result from a life of study. 
82. Dictionary sources of that time, other than Dr. Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the 
English Language, are discussed below. See infra note 126 (observing entry for science in dictionary 
of Thomas Sheridan) and discussion infra Part III.C.1 (analyzing entry for science in dictionary of 
Noah Webster). 
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English Language.83 In his editions of the Dictionary leading up to the 
Constitutional Convention, Dr. Johnson defined science as follows: 
1. Knowledge. 
2. Certainty grounded on demonstration. 
3. Art attained by precepts, or built on principles. 
4. Any art or species of knowledge. 
5. One of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetorick, logick, 
arithmetick, musick, geometry, astronomy. 84 
Dr. Johnson stated these entries in order of their progression in 
meaning through time, their chronological etymology-the first 
being the most primitive and the last being the most developed at 
that time. 85 
Because Dr. Johnson arranged word entries according to their 
chronological etymology, the first entry for science-knowledge-
reflects the most primitive meaning, not necessarily the word's most 
common use at the time of the Framing. As so many have done, it 
would be incorrect to assume that Science in the Copyright Clause 
must mean knowledge based solely on the fact that the first entry in 
the Dictionary is knowledge. 86 The order of entry does not suggest 
any usage pattern of the word. 87 Any conclusion that Science in the 
83. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (employing Dr. 
johnson's Dictionary to analyze meaning of word at time of Framing); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (quoting from Dr. johnson's Dictionary to arrive at meaning of limited in 
Copyright Clause); Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 347 
(1999) (Scalia,]., concurring in part) (quoting Dr. johnson's Dictionary to define enumeration at 
time of Framing); WALTERSCHEID, supra note 11, at 125 (relying on johnson's dictionary for 
meaning of Science at time of Framing); Rich, supra note 11, at 396 (same). Although I believe 
there is better evidence than the Dictionary that speaks to the meaning of Science in the 
Copyright Clause, I begin with it because it is the primary source to which scholars and judges 
cite as determining the issue. 
84. jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated). The quotation of the five entries for science 
does not include the examples that johnson quoted from others who employed the term in one 
of the five ways indicated. 
85. Id. at 6 of preface (unpaginated); see supra note I2; see also RoBERT DEMARIA, ]R., 
jOHNSON'S DICTIONARY AND THE LANGUAGE OF LEARNING 54 (1986) (referring to the first 
definition for science in Dr. johnson's Dictionary as a "primitive" meaning as compared to the 
subsequent entries). 
86. See discussion supra Part II.B.l. 
87. See id. 
283 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
Copyright Clause must mean general knowledge because of the 
primacy of the first entry for science in the Dictionary is simply 
wrong. 88 
Yet even if the first entry does not speak to science's usage 
pattern, that first entry is still relevant in understanding a general 
meaning of science at the Framing. Dr. Johnson's subsequent entries 
for a word build upon prior meanings for that word.89 Therefore, the 
first entry for science should not be altogether ignored. Further 
examination of that entry, and the four subsequent entries, is in 
order. 
Under the first entry, Dr. Johnson noted two examples that 
suggest a specific connotation for his entry of knowledge. The 
examples consist of a quotation from Henry Hammond that speaks 
of "God's sight or science" as "seeing every thing as it is" and a 
quotation from Joseph Glanville that refers to the "indisputable 
mathematicks" as "the only science Heaven hath yet vouchsafed 
humanity."90 Both of these examples suggest the sort of knowledge 
that cannot be doubted-God's sight and the indisputable nature of 
mathematics. They suggest certainty of conclusion. According to Dr. 
Johnson, then, science in its most primitive form meant the sort of 
knowledge that results in certainty. 
Dr. Johnson explained his second and third entries in a way that 
further supports this understanding of certainty in science. The 
second entry is: "Certainty grounded on demonstration."91 This 
88. See id. 
89. See jOHNSON, supra note 11, at 6 of preface (unpaginated). 
90. jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated) (emphasis omitted). 
The quotation that Dr. Johnson employed from Henry Hammond is the following: 
[I]f we will but conceive God's sight or science before the creation of the world to be 
coextended to all and every part of the world, seeing every thing as it is . . . his 
prescience or foresight of any action of mine (or rather his science or sight) from all 
eternity, !ayes no necessity on any thing to . . . come to passe, any more then my 
seeing the sun move, hath to doe in the moving of it . . . . 
H. HAMMOND, OF FUNDAMENTALS IN A NOTION REFERRING TO PRACTISE 161 (1654) (emphasis 
omitted). 
The quotation that Dr. Johnson employed from joseph Glanville is the following: "[T]he 
indisputable Mathematicks, the only Science Heaven hath yet vouchsaft Humanity, have but few 
Votaries among the slaves of the Stagirite." joseph Glanvill, Scepsis Scientifica: or, Confest Ignorance, 
The Way to Science, in AN ESSAY OF THE VANITY OF DOGMATIZING, AND CONFIDENT OPINION 142 
Qohn Owen ed., 1885) (emphasis omitted). 
91. jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated). 
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suggests the sort of knowledge that arises from empirical evidence. 
The third entry is: "Art attained by precepts, or built on 
principles."92 The act of building upon principles and precepts 
implies the act of reasoning. Thus, Dr. Johnson's second and third 
meanings suggest knowledge deriving from experience and reason, 
consistent with the Enlightenment. 93 
The fourth and fifth entries suggest a classification of knowledge. 
The fourth is: "Any art or species of knowledge"; and the fifth: "One 
of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetorick, logick, arithmetick, 
musick, geometry, astronomy."94 Both of these entries suggest 
classifying knowledge into distinct bodies or groupings. They 
suggest an organized system. 
Although these five entries portray distinctions in meanings, 
they are unified in theme and general meaning. Indeed, Dr. Johnson 
noted his intent that each subsequent entry in his Dictionary build 
upon the meanings in prior entries.95 Therefore, the fifth and fourth 
entries, which suggest a classification of knowledge, build upon the 
third and second, which suggest experience and reason as the means 
for gaining knowledge, which builds upon the first, which suggests a 
certainty of knowledge. One unifying meaning that encompasses the 
primary meanings of all five entries would be the following: certainty 
of knowledge, which derives from reason and experience, that yields 
an organized grouping of subjects. Of course such an aggregated 
definition does not necessarily reflect the specific meaning of Science 
in the Copyright Clause. But the aggregation is helpful in 
understanding a general meaning that would encompass the themes 
of science at the time of the Framing. It represents a data point to 
compare against a specific meaning derived from the text of the 
Clause. 
B. Legislative History 
The history of the Copyright Clause began on August 18, 1787, 
when two delegates at the Constitutional Convention, James 
Madison and Charles Pinckney, each proposed a copyright power. 96 
92. Id. 
93. See discussion supra Part liLA. I (noting reason and experience as tools of science in 
the Enlightenment). 
94. jOHNSON, supra note II (unpaginated). 
95. See id. at 6 of preface ("[E]very foregoing explanation should tend to that which 
follows, and the series be regularly concatenated from the first notion to the last."). 
96. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 
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Those proposals were submitted to the Committee on Detail, which 
ultimately drafted the final language reflected in the Clause. 97 As 
563-64 (Charles Callan Tansill ed., 1927) [hereinafter FORMATION OF THE UNION]. 
97. See 2 RECORDS, supra note 77, at 473. Backgrounds of several Committee members are 
consistent with an interpretation of Science that suggests a scholastic denotation. Of the eleven 
members, at least nine had backgrounds suggesting that the group composed the educated elite 
of that time. 
James Madison was the only Committee member who had proposed a copyright power. 
See supra note 96 and accompanying text. For that reason, he might be viewed as the most 
influential Committee member regarding the text of the Copyright Clause. But see discussion 
infra note 110 (introducing the possibility that Madison may not have been responsible for 
inclusion of Science in Copyright Clause). His background that is relevant to copyright and 
science I discuss infra in Part lli.B.2, and that discussion suggests he would view science as 
connoting a field of study. 
Abraham Baldwin came to the Constitutional Convention with experience in copyright, 
law, and formal education. As a member of the Georgia legislature, he sponsored Georgia's 
copyright statute, which purported to "encourage men of learning and genius to publish their 
writings." See COULTER, supra note 81, at 43-44 (internal quotation marks omitted). Baldwin 
declined a professorship at Yale University to develop an educational plan for secondary and 
higher education in Georgia, which led to the creation of Franklin College, now called the 
University of Georgia, of which he was the first president in 1786. I d. at 30, 53-56, 64, 76. His 
life devoted to study, Baldwin once noted that "public prosperity and even existence very much 
depends upon suitably forming the minds and morals of their Citizens." Id. at 54. An 
interpretation of Science as designating scholastic subject matter or fields of study would be 
consistent with the life of Abraham Baldwin. 
John Dickinson was thought to be one of the most learned men of the Framers. See 
MILTON E. FLOWER, jOHN DICKINSON: CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTIONARY 12-19 (1983); M. E. 
BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 99 (2d ed. rev. 1994). He warned against persons who would "slight learning." 
CHARLES]. STILLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ]OHN DICKINSON, 1732-1808, at 330-31 (1891). He 
once wrote: "'Foolish questions,' fables, and endless genealogies, profane and vain babblings, 
oppositions of science falsely so called, and winds of doctrine the apostle Paul has justly 
condemned, and these, to be sure, should be consigned to perpetual oblivion." Id. Thus, 
Dickinson not only appreciated learning, he loathed anything that distracted from it. It is 
therefore likely that Dickinson would not have viewed the purpose of copyright as promoting 
any sort of knowledge (e.g., fictional fantasy). 
Hugh Williamson was a man of science. See BRADFORD, supra, at I 75-76. Prior to the 
Constitutional Convention, he had served as a professor of mathematics at the College of 
Philadelphia; earned his medical doctor degree; became a member of the American Philosophical 
Society (an organization with a purpose to promote useful knowledge in the sciences and 
humanities through scholarly research); served on an official commission to observe the paths of 
Venus and Mercury; articulated a theory on climate in North America; and participated in 
electrical experiments with Benjamin Franklin. Id. If he were to view Science in the Copyright 
Clause as a term representative of his own life, it would represent established subjects of study. 
Rufus King graduated first in his class at Harvard College-first in mathematics; first in 
language; and first in oratory. ROBERT ERNST, RUFUS KING: AMERICAN FEDERALIST 20 n.25 
(1968). 
Gouverneur Morris attended the Academy of Philadelphia and King's College. MAX M. 
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discussed in the two subsections below, their proposals suggest that 
Science in the Clause has a meaning that is educationally or 
scholastically focused. 
1. Pinckney's proposals 
Charles Pinckney proposed two congressional powers that were 
relevant to copyright. They are the following: first, "To establish 
seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences"; 
and second, "To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain 
time."98 
Pinckney's first proposal aids in understanding the meaning of 
Science in the Copyright Clause. Two observations are noteworthy. 
First, Pinckney's proposal is the only one to use the word science (in 
the plural form, though). Indeed, the proposal employs three words 
(or a form of those words) that appear in the Copyright Clause: 
promotion, arts, and sciences. The similarity between the phrase 
"promotion of the arts & sciences" in Pinckney's proposal and 
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" in the Copyright 
Clause is remarkable. 99 The absence of any other proposal using the 
MINTZ, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 16 (1970). 
David Bready, who was the chair of the Committee on Detail, attended the College of 
New Jersey (now Princeton). DONALD SCARINCI, DAVID BREARLEY AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNITED STATES CoNSTITUTION 44-46 (2005). The full extent of Brearley's studies is a source of 
debate. 
Roger Sherman was educated in common schools, but was well read in the areas of 
theology, history, law, and politics. ROGER SHERMAN BOARDMAN, ROGER SHERMAN SIGNER AND 
STATESMAN 15-21 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1938); BRADFORD, supra, at 22. 
Daniel Carroll attended the prestigious College of St. Orner in Flanders for six years, 
which provided advanced education for English Catholics. MARY VIRGINA GEIGER, DANIEL 
CARROLL: A FRAMER OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1943). 
The extent of education of only two Committee members, Pierce Butler and Nicholas 
Gilman, is uncertain. Pierce Butler once served as an officer in the British Army and was a man 
of great wealth and considerable influence. LEWRIGHT B. SIKES, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF PIERCE 
BUTLER, SOUTH CAROLINA STATESMAN 2-3 (1979). Nicholas Gilman was educated in public 
schools. BRADFORD, supra, at 4. It is thought that Gilman said little, following the lead of those 
more decisive around him. Id. 
98. FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 96, at 564. Between the two powers listed, 
Pinckney also presented two other powers: "To grant charters of incorporation" and "To grant 
patents for useful inventions." Id. 
99. Similarly, the word "useful" in the Copyright Clause, which modifies the word 
describing patents-Arts-appears to originate in Pinckney's third proposal, "useful inventions." 
Professor Oliar notes the similarity in verbiage between the Science Clause and Pinckney's 
proposal. See Oliar, supra note 45, at 448 n.IOO. 
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three words promote, science, or art, coupled with the combination of 
the same three words in proximity to one another in both Pinckney's 
proposal and the Clause, suggests that the three words in the Clause 
share the same meaning as in Pinckney's proposal-and in 
particular, the meaning of Science. 100 It therefore appears that the 
Committee on Detail adopted science from Pinckney's proposal, 
implicitly adopting Pinckney's meaning. 
Second, Pinckney's proposal indicates a precise meaning of 
science as he employed it. By proposing to establish seminaries for 
the promotion of the sciences, Pinckney employs science to 
communicate an educational or scholastic denotation. 101 
Furthermore, sciences in seminaries represent particular branches of 
study. Pinckney's proposal therefore conveys a meaning of sciences 
as suggesting the categories of study that are present in a scholastic 
context. 
2. Madison's proposals 
Madison proposed three powers relevant to copyright. They 
consist of the following (in the order proposed): first, "To secure to 
literary authors their copy rights for a limited time"; second, "To 
establish an University"; and third, "To encourage by premiums & 
provisiOns, the advancement of useful knowledge and 
discoveries." 102 
Two observations about these proposals are noteworthy as they 
relate to the meaning of Science. First, Madison appears to have 
grouped all his proposed powers-not just the ones listed above-
according to their similarity in substance. For instance, his first four 
proposed powers (not listed above) concern jurisdictions for 
territories or sovereignties that were not in the United States. 103 In 
100. See Oliar, supra note 31, at 1809-10 (observing that Science and Arts in the Intellectual 
Property Clause derive from Pinckney's proposal). 
101. See id. at 1806-07 (describing Pinckney's proposal as an "education" power). 
102. FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 96, at 563. 
103. Those first four proposals consisted of the following: 
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"To institute temporary Governments for New States arising therein" 
"To regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U. 
States" 
"To exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the Seat of the General Government, 
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the three powers listed above, the copyright power immediately 
precedes a power related to formal education and another to useful 
knowledge. 104 Consistent, then, with Madison's practice of grouping 
related powers, the proximity of the copyright power to two powers 
that deal with education and useful knowledge suggests the 
copyright power's general scope and purpose-a context of 
educational learning. 
Second, Madison never used the word science in his 
proposals. 105 The meaning of Science cannot be directly linked to 
any of the proposals that Madison set forth. Instead, the suggestion 
of educational learning that the three proposals generally suggest 
may only indirectly speak to the meaning of Science in the Clause. 
That Madison did not use the word science in his proposal, 
however, should not be understood to mean that his usage pattern of 
that word was not relevant to its appearance in the Copyright 
Clause. Madison was a member of the ten-member Committee on 
Detail that drafted the Copyright Clause. 106 And he was the only 
member of the Committee who had proposed a copyright power 
(Charles Pinckney was not a Committee member) .107 Also, prior to 
the Constitutional Convention, Madison had served as one of three 
Virginian legislators who prepared the Virginia copyright statute, 
and he had served on a three-member Continental Congress 
committee that had drafted a resolution recommending individual 
states enact copyright statutes. 108 After the convention, he is the 
only Framer to have discussed the copyright power in defending the 
Constitution.109 
of the Legislature of the State or States com prizing the same, being first obtained." 
Id. at 563. 
104. Id. 
105. See id. 
106. 2 RECORDS, supra note 77, at 473. 
107. Seeid. 
108. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, jOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1781-86), S. 
October 17, 1785-january 21, 1786, at 39, 40 (Richmond, 1828); see also BRUCE W. BUGBEE, 
GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 121 (1967). Interestingly, neither of these 
pieces of legislation referred to science or any other reason-instrumental or otherwise-for 
copyright. 
109. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 Qames Madison) Qacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Not long 
after the Constitutional Convention, Charles Pinckney did publish a pamphlet entitled, 
"Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention in 
Philadelphia," which referenced the copyright power. See 3 RECORDS, supra note 77, at 106. 
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These historical evidences suggest that Madison may have held a 
keen interest in the drafting of the Copyright Clause. Moreover, with 
his interest in copyright ostensibly well known by other Committee 
members, his views on the Copyright Clause likely would have 
carried great weight. 110 Therefore, examining Madison's use of the 
word science in other works may further illuminate the meaning of 
Science in the Clause. That examination follows in the paragraph 
below. 
Madison's use of the term science in writings prior to the 
Constitutional Convention suggests a specific meaning. My research 
revealed seven writings prior to the Convention where Madison 
employed science or sciences. The context of all seven writings indicate 
that Madison employed science to mean a branch of study or category 
of specialized knowledge as opposed to mere general knowledge 
(e.g., "the Science of Morals"; "the most sublime of all Sciences"; 
"the science of commerce"). 111 Madison's use of science after the 
110. Although Madison's view on the meaning of science is certainly worthy of 
consideration, it may not be the dispositive authority on the meaning of Science in the Copyright 
Clause. Tellingly, neither the copyright power that Madison proposed at the Convention, the 
Virginia copyright statute that he prepared, nor the Continental Congress copyright resolution 
that he helped draft-mention science. See sources cited supra notes 106, 108. Indeed, an 
instrumental reason for copyright protection appears in neither his copyright-power proposal, 
the Virginia copyright statute, nor the Continental Congress resolution. See supra notes 102, 106, 
108. Madison apparently did not think it necessary to mention any reason for copyright -science 
or otherwise. Thus, the inclusion of Science in the Copyright Clause may not have reflected 
Madison's opinion. There is thus reason to think that others on the Committee may have been 
responsible for Science appearing in the Clause. Hence, the backgrounds of other Committee 
members should also be examined for further indications of Science's meaning. See supra text 
accompanying note 97. 
111. Further excerpts of the seven instances are as follows: 
In 1772, Madison wrote: "I think you made a judicious choice of History and the science of 
morals for your winter's study." Letter from james Madison to William Bradford (Nov. 9, 1772), 
in 1 THE WR!TlNGS OF ]AMES MADISON 11 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900) (hereinafter MADISON 
WRITINGS] (emphasis added). 
In 1773, Madison wrote: "[K]eep the Ministry obliquely in View whatever your profession 
be. This will lead you to cultivate an acquaintace [sic] occasionally with the most sublime of all 
Sciences .... "Letter from james Madison to William Bradford (Sept. 25, 1773), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF jAMES MADISON 96 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1962) 
[hereinafter MADISON PAPERS] (emphasis added). 
In 1773, Madison wrote: "I intend myself to read Law occasionally and have procured 
books for that purpose so that you need not fear offending me by Allusions to that science." 
Letter from james Madison to William Bradford (Dec. 1, 1773), in 1 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 
100-101 (emphasis added). 
In 1779, Madison wrote: "From a new arrangement of the college here nothing is in 
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Constitutional Convention suggests the same meaning: of sixteen 
instances after the Convention, fourteen clearly indicate a particular 
branch of study (e.g., "political science"; "science of government"; 
"mathematical science"; "law as a science"); 112 the other two 
future to be taught but the higher & rarer branches of Science." Letter from James Madison to 
James Madison, Sr. (Dec. 8, 1779), in 1 MADISON WRITINGS, supra, at 56 (emphasis added). 
In 1783, Madison wrote: "That of G. B. [Great Britain] is in the science of commerce 
particularly worthy of our attention .... " Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph 
(May 20, 1783), in 1 MADISON WRITINGS, supra, at 467 (emphasis added). 
In 1783, Madison wrote: "But his wish is to be introduced in the first instance into a 
Gentleman's family where he may at the same time be employ'd in teaching the Languages & 
some of the more useful branches of science .... " Letter from James Madison to the Reverend 
James Madison. (Oct. 2, 1783), in 7 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 365 (emphasis added). 
In 1783, Madison wrote in a Virginia Committee Report: "[W]ar is become a 
Science .... "Report from James Madison to Congress (Sept. 19, 1783), in 7 MADISON PAPERS, 
supra, at 348. 
112. The fourteen instances are as follows: 
(I) "[B]y dividing & subdividing the branches of Science now in the same group." Letter from 
James Madison to Frederick Beasley (Dec. 22, 1824), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at 
212. 
(2) "This has always been regarded by us as claiming an important place in so comprehensive a 
School of Science." I d. 
(3) "Much may be expected from the progress and diffusion of political science in dissipating 
errors .... " Letter from James Madison to Unknown (Mat. 1836), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, 
supra note 111, at 610. 
(4) "[A]nd to all who take an interest in the progress of political science and the cause of true 
liberty." James Madison's Will (Apr. 19, 1835), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note I 1 I. at 549. 
(S) "Our history, short as it is, has already disclosed great errors sanctioned by great names, in 
political science .... " Letter from James Madison to Daniel Drake Oan. 12, 1835), in 9 
MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 546. 
(6) "[T]he system forming an innovation and an epoch in the science of Government no less 
honorable to the people to whom it owed its birth .... " Letter from James Madison to 
Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at 430 n.6. 
(7) "To appreciate your proposed expedient for a standard of measures & weights would require 
more time than I can apply, & more mathematical Science than I retain." Letter from James 
Madison to A. B. Woodward (Sept. 11, 1824), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 207. 
(8) "I know not a better service, that could be rendered to the science of political 
economy .... "Letter from James Madison to Thomas Cooper (Mar. 23, 1824), in 9 MADISON 
WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 179. 
(9) "[T]hat the progress of political Science, and the lessons of experience will not be lost on the 
National Council." Id. at 181. 
(10) "Throughout the Civilized World, nations are courting the praise of fostering Science and 
the useful Arts, and are opening their eyes to the principles and the blessings of Representative 
Government." Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 MADISON 
WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at 107. 
(II) "[T]here are some considerations to be taken into the account which have been little 
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instances are not as clear, but are at least consistent with the 
particular-branch-of-study meaning. 113 Madison therefore appears to 
have consistently employed science in a manner suggesting particular 
branches of study. 
Of course Madison's usage pattern of the word science does not 
directly speak to its meaning in the Clause. Yet it can at least be said 
that Madison's usage pattern would be consistent with an 
interpretation of Science in the Clause that suggests branches of 
study. And given Madison's history surrounding both copyright law 
generally and its implementation into the Constitution, consistency 
between Madison's usage pattern and the interpretation of the 
Clause becomes a relevant consideration. 
C. Textual Analysis 
In addition to historical evidence from the convention, the text of 
the Copyright Clause indicates a precise meaning of Science: a 
system of knowledge comprising, or derived from, distinct branches 
of study. This conclusion stems from two textual indicators: first, 
Adverted to by the most oracular Authors on the Science of Govt .... " Letter from james 
Madison to john G. jackson (Dec. 27, 1821), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 76. 
(12) "&as a source perhaps of some lights on the Science of Govt. the legitimate meaning of the 
Instrument must be derived from the text itself .... " Id. at 72 n.l. 
(13) "It is not only desirable therefore that the national code should receive whatever 
improvements the cultivation of law as a science may impart but that the local codes should be 
improved in like manner .... " Letter from james Madison to Peter S. Du Ponceau (May 
1821), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 63. 
(14) "But a Central Institution is just now on foot in the State of Virginia, which in its 
development will embrace an extensive circle of sciences . . . . " Letter from james Madison to 
Charles Keilsall (Oct. 1817), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF jAMES MADISON 49 a. B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1867). 
Further instances of Madison's use of science may arise in a report he assisted in drafting 
for the Virginia General Assembly in 1818. See Report of the Board of Commissioners for the 
University of Virginia to the Virginia General Assembly (Aug. 4, 1818), in THE PAPERS OF ]AMES 
MADISON 326-39 a .C.A. Stagg ed.) available at http:/ /rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders 
/default.xqy?keys=JSMN-print&mode=TOC. Those instances, however, cannot be ascribed to 
Madison personally, however, because 20 other committee members share responsibility for the 
report. See id. at 338-39. 
113. The two other instances do not indicate a meaning contrary to branch of knowledge 
(i.e., referring to the University of Virginia as "a temple dedicated to science"; referring to 
Thomas Jefferson as a "luminary of Science"). See Letter from james Madison to Samuel Harrison 
Smith (Nov. 4, 1826), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note Ill, at 258; Letter from james 
Madison to N.P. Trist Quly 6, 1826), in 9 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 111, at 248. 
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the juxtaposition of Science and useful Arts; and second, the 
inconsistency between the singular form of Science and the plural 
form of Arts. Together, these two textual evidences indicate a precise 
meaning. 
1. The juxtaposition of Science and Arts 
That the Copyright Clause conjoins Science with useful Arts 
implies meaning. On this point, the Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED) is instructive.ll 4 Like johnson's Dictionary, the OED does 
not order its entries for words according to most common usage. 115 
Rather, it orders them according to chronological etymologyY 6 
The OED indicates that its third entry for science was in use 
during the time of the Framing. 117 That entry states: "(a) A 
particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of 
learning. (b) Contradistinguished from art." 118 Subdefinition (b) 
indicates that where science is contrasted with art, science means a 
particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of 
learning. 
Such a contrast between science and arts appears in the Copyright 
Clause, implying that Science refers to the third entry definition in 
the OED-a particular branch of knowledge or study. The contrast is 
apparent from the adjective useful that precedes only Arts. The word 
useful is important in the Clause because, as a general matter, arts 
could be interpreted two different ways alongside science. On the 
one hand, arts could mean branches of study-as in the seven liberal 
arts 119 -which use of arts was common at the Framing. 120 On the 
114. See 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 648-49 (2d ed. 1989) (hereinafter OED). 
115. DONNA LEE BERG, A GUIDE TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 28 (1993). 
116. Id. 
117. 14 OED, supra note 114, at 648-49. 
118. Jd. The third entry lists two more meanings, neither of which seem relevant in the 
Copyright Clause: "c. the noble science (of defence): the art of boxing or that of fencing" and 
"d. A craft, trade, or occupation requiring trained skill. Obsolete." Id. Subdefinition (c) would 
not apply to the extent that the Copyright Clause does not suggest a meaning of boxing or 
fencing (although those arts would have required knowledge and skill). Subdefinition (d) also 
does not apply given that it is obsolete, the last use noted in 1660. 
119. The OED explains: "In the Middle Ages, 'the seven (liberal) sciences' was often 
used synonymously with 'the seven liberal arts', for the group of studies comprised by the 
Trivium (Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric) and the Quadrivium (Arithmetic, Music, Geometry, 
Astronomy)." 14 OED, supra note 114, at 648. 
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other hand, arts could mean practical applications of knowledge121 -
as in the art practiced by an artisan or craftsman. Hence, two 
meanings of arts were possible, and the Framers provided a clear 
indication of which meaning they intended. They employed useful 
next to Arts to convey the meaning of practical applications of 
knowledge. As practical applications of knowledge, useful Arts 
contrasts with the source of the theoretical knowledge that underlies 
it, i.e., Science.122 In short, the Copyright Clause contrasts Science 
with useful Arts. Accordingly, Science takes on the third entry in the 
OED-a particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized 
department of learning. 123 
The contrast between Science and Arts is further apparent in the 
balance and parallelism of the Copyright (and Patent) Clause-
Science, Authors, and Writings each precedes useful Arts, Inventors, and 
Discoveries, respectively. 124 The first group corresponds to copyright 
and the second to patent, ultimately suggesting a distinction in 
meaning between Science and useful Arts, the former representing 
copyright and the latter patent. 125 That distinction in meaning 
suggests a contrast between Science and Arts in the Clause. As the 
OED indicates, such a contrast implies that Science means a 
particular branch of knowledge or study. 
Lexicography sources at the Framing are consistent with 
interpreting Science as a particular branch of knowledge or study. As 
discussed above, Dr. Johnson's Dictionary is perhaps the most 
120. For instance, four state copyright statutes that were enacted prior to the 
Constitutional Convention employed the term science, and did so in the phrase "arts and 
sciences" without employing useful next to either arts or sciences. See Copyright Acts of 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, 
supra note 81, at 4, 8, 9, II. Ostensibly, the use of arts here served as a synonym with sciences, 
i.e., suggesting the liberal arts as the categories of scientific studies. 
121. The OED defines the meaning of art that contrasts with science as a practical 
application of any science. See 14 OED, supra note 114, at 649. 
122. See id. ("The distinction [between science and art] as commonly apprehended is that a 
science is concerned with theoretic truth, and an art with methods for effecting certain 
results."). 
123. See id. 
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). 
125. See sources cited supra note 53; cf. RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT 
LAW 15 (1925) (introducing balanced nature of Copyright and Patent Clause). 
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authoritative source of that time. The fourth definition for science 
states: a "species of knowledge." 126 The fifth definition states: "One 
of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetoric, logick, arithmetic, 
musick, geometry, astronomy." 127 Dr. Johnson's conception of 
science as species of knowledge and as particular subject areas of 
study is consistent with Science as branches of knowledge or study. 
Noah Webster's definition of science is also instructive. 128 
Webster explained science as the collection of general principles or 
truths in a particular subject matter. 129 Science, according to 
Webster, represents the abstract principles in a particular subject 
that controls the practical application of knowledge in the art. 13 In 
his first dictionary, published in 1828, Webster stated: "In general, 
an art is that which depends on practice or performance, and science 
that which depends on abstract or speculative principles. The theory 
of music is a science; the practice of it an art." 131 Hence, Webster 
recognized the contrast between art and science, and he treated 
science as the particular focus of study. 132 
126. jOHNSON, supra note 11. See also THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. Philadelphia 1796) (unpaginated) (defining science as 
"Knowledge . . . any species of knowledge"). 
127. jOHNSON, supra note 11. 
128. See NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, 
S. Converse 1828) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S 1828 DICTIONARY] (unpaginated). In addition to his 
1828 dictionary being the first dictionary published in the United States, Webster was an 
influential advocate for copyright at the time of the Framing. See WARFEL, supra note 81, at 53-
59. Webster would have been well familiar with the focus on science and arts in the 
Constitution. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xviii. 
129. Webster described science as follows: 
In philosophy, a collection of the general principles or leading truths relating to any 
subject. Pure science, as the mathematics, is built on self-evident truths; but the term 
science is also applied to other subjects founded on generally acknowledged truths, as 
metaphysics; or on experiment and observation, as chimistry [sic] and natural philosophy; 
or even to an assemblage of the general principles of an art, as the science or 
agriculture; the science of navigation. Arts relate to practice, as painting and sculpture. 
WEBSTER'S 1828 DICTIONARY (unpaginated). 
130. See id. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. The same meaning appears in the 1752 edition of Ephraim Chambers's 
Cyclopaedia, or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, which meaning Professor Bernard Cohen 
associated with Science in the Copyright Clause. See EPHRAIM CHAMBERS, CYCLOPAOD!A, OR, AN 
UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 32 (London 1728); COHEN supra note 44, at 306-
08. Chambers noted that when science is used in opposition to art, it "is particularly used for a 
form'd System of any Branch of Knowledge; comprehending the Doctrine, Reason and Theory, of 
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Interpreting Science as branch of study rather than mere general 
knowledge is consistent with writings of then-influential thinkers. 133 
In addition to the writings of James Madison that I discuss above, I 
give a few examples here. 134 In a letter to his wife, John Adams 
wrote: "The science of government it is my duty to study, more than 
all other sciences; the arts of legislation and administration and 
negotiation ought to take place of, indeed to exclude, in a manner, 
all other arts." 135 Here, government is the abstract branch of study, 
the science. The applications of that science are the practical 
activities of government, i.e., the arts of legislation, administration, 
and negotiation. 
Alexander Hamilton referred to the "sciences of morals and 
politics." 136 Ben Franklin wrote: "Will not the Knowledge of the 
Mathematicks, Astronomy, and Natural Philosophy, those sublime 
Sciences, give a Right to the Character of a Man of Sense?" 137 Thomas 
Jefferson wrote of "government, religion, morality and every other 
science." 138 
In sum, the contrast of Science and Arts in the Clause indicates 
that Science has a meaning that indicates a branch of study or 
category of knowledge. This meaning is consistent with dictionaries 
of the time and the writings of influential thinkers. 
2. The singular-plural inconsistency between Science and Arts 
The singular form of Science in the Copyright Clause suggests 
meaning. In the singular form, science as meaning branch of study 
usually signifies only one particular branch. Yet although the 
the Thing, without any immediate Application thereof to any Uses or Offices of life." CHAMBERS, 
supra, at 32. Hence, Chambers observed that science, when contrasted with art, suggests a 
theoretic branch of knowledge. 
133. These examples do not represent a comprehensive account of each writer's use of the 
word. The examples demonstrate only that Science as meaning particular branches of study 
would not have been foreign in the writings of influential thinkers of the time. 
134. See discussion supra Part Ill.B.2. 
135. Letter from john Adams to Abigail Adams (without date, 1780), in FAMILIAR LETTERS 
OF jOHN ADAMS AND HIS WIFE ABIGAIL ADAMS, DURING THE REVOLUTION 381 (Charles Francis 
Adams ed. 1875) [hereinafter FAMILIAR LETTERS] (emphasis added). 
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) Qacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
137. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, A MAN OF SENSE (1735), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN 
FRANKI.IN 16 (Leonard W. Labaree ed. 1960) (emphasis added). 
138. Seidel, supra note 11, at 12 n.15. 
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Copyright Clause employs Science in the singular, presumably the 
Clause does not signify only one particular branch. So if Science 
represents branches of study, why isn't it in the plural? 
This question becomes more pressing given that the Committee 
on Detail likely deliberately chose to place Science in the singular 
rather than the plural. As an initial matter, to the extent that the 
Committee was familiar with the state copyright statutes, it is 
relevant that the state copyright statutes that employed the term 
science (four in total) did so in the plural, referring to "the arts and 
sciences." 139 Furthermore, recall that the only reference to science in 
the proposals under consideration was Pinckney's proposal, and that 
proposal referred to the plural form-i.e., sciences. 140 Recall also 
that the Copyright Clause reflects great attention to stylistic 
consistency; however, Science in the singular form creates a glaring 
stylistic inconsistency as it appears next to the plural Arts. 141 The 
inconsistency becomes more apparent when considering the fact that 
other than Science, all nouns in the Clause unique to either the 
copyright or patent powers are in the plura1. 142 Thus, the departure 
from the plural form in the state copyright statutes, the departure 
from the plural form in Pinckney's proposal, and the blatant stylistic 
inconsistency of the singular form all indicate a deliberate choice to 
make Science singular. Why? 
By placing Science in the singular, the Committee on Detail 
apparently intended a meaning distinct from the plural sciences. That 
meaning consists of an abstraction from the particular sciences, i.e., the 
systemic whole of individual sciences. In the plural, sciences represents 
the particular subjects of study, whereas science represents the system 
comprising the particular subjects of study. The singular captures the 
collective whole as opposed to the collection of individual parts. 
139. See supra note 120. 
140. See discussion supra Part III.B; FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 96, at 564. 
141. The words in the Clause relating to copyright precede the words relating to patent 
(Science, Authors, and Writings respectively precede useful Arts, Inventors, and Discoveries). 
See supra note 53. 
142. See U.S. CoN ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries."). Although "right" is in the singular, it is not specific to either the 
copyright or patent powers. 
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Such a connotation is apparent in an analogous context-the 
word, law. In the singular, law may represent the collective whole of 
all possible laws; it is a general abstraction of all the particular 
laws. 143 When we say "law restrains conduct," we speak of law as a 
general concept encompassing the system of all particular laws. By 
contrast, in the plural, the word laws represents particular laws. 
When we say "laws restrain conduct," we speak of laws as the actual, 
individual laws. Hence, there are two ways to express the entirety of 
a set of subjects-the singular abstraction (e.g., law or science) and 
the plural particulars (e.g., laws or sciences). 
These two ways of expressing the collection of subjects admit a 
distinction in meaning. The meaning of the singular abstraction 
includes the collective whole of the particulars, but the meaning of 
the plural particulars does not. That is, a representation of the 
collective whole suggests more than its individual parts. The sum is 
greater than its parts. Law suggests more than laws. Science suggests 
more than sciences. Science as a representation of the collective whole 
of all specific branches of study captures a system that derives from 
all those specific branches. Whereas sciences in the plural represents 
only the individual sciences operating independently of the others, 
science in the singular represents the entire system of all possible 
particular sciences functioning together as one. Stated another way, 
science in the singular form represents the system of knowledge from 
which all the particular branches derive. 
The Committee on Detail thus appears to have placed Science in 
the singular form to capture the abstract meaning of all branches of 
science, or in other words, the system from which the particulars 
derive. 144 This interpretation of Science in the singular is supported 
143. See THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 619 (Stephen Michael Sheppard 
ed., 2011). 
144. This reason for placing Science in the singular further explains why the Committee 
kept arts in the plural, purposefully creating an inconsistency between Science and Arts. As 
discussed above, useful Arts means the practical applications that derive from the theoretic truth 
contained in the sciences. See 14 OED, supra note 114, at 649. Abstracting from the specific 
practical applications of the useful Arts implies the sciences that underlie those arts. Science 
captures the abstractions of the applications, arts. Accordingly, there is nothing to abstract from 
the specific applications of useful Arts that would not be captured within the abstract term of 
Science. It would make no sense to place useful Arts in the singular form as representing an 
abstraction of those Arts, for the abstraction is contained in Science. The Committee apparently 
intended that the meaning of all the individual applications of Science-i.e., the useful Arts-
imply nothing more than all those individual applications. 
298 
259 The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause 
by a writing of one of the members of the Committee on Detail, 
Hugh Williamson. Williamson wrote: 
[T]he Grecians . . . exceeded all other nations in arts and 
learning. The Grecians, or rather the Athenians, were not indebted 
to soil or climate for the extraordinary progress they made in science 
and the liberal arts; thel were merely indebted to the high degree of 
liberty they enjoyed. 14 
Here, Williamson appears to employ both science and liberal arts 
as words meaning a group of theoretical studies. Both are collective 
nouns. 146 Yet science is in the singular and liberal arts is in the plural, 
suggesting that science represents the system of the grouping of 
studies, whereas liberal arts represents the seven specific groupings 
that then comprised all possible liberal arts (grammar, rhetoric, 
logic, arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) .147 
An implication of construing Science to mean a system that 
derives from a collective whole is that Science would include 
branches not yet in existence-i.e., evolving branches. The system as 
a whole contemplates additions and changes to the component parts. 
It is broader than its individual pieces. Science, then, would not be 
limited to only the branches of study that existed at the Framing; it 
would contemplate growing and evolving categories. 
Support for this interpretation arises in the writing of John 
Adams. Adams alluded to this principle of evolving branches of 
knowledge in a letter to Abigail Adams in 1800, while President of 
the United States. 148 He wrote: "I must study politics and war, that 
my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and 
philosophy . . . geography, natural history and naval architecture, 
navigation, commerce, and agriculture, in order to give their children 
a right to study paintin~, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, 
tapestry, and porcelain." 1 9 Adams thus spoke of a potential for 
145. Hugh Williamson, A Discourse on the Benefits of Civil History, delivered before the New-York 
Historical Society (Dec 6, 1810), in 2 COLLECTIONS OF THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, FOR THE 
YEAR 1814,30-31 (New York, Van Winkle & Wiley 1814) (emphasis added). 
146. See id. 
147. Compare id. with]OHNSON, supra note 11 (listing the seven liberal arts as the fifth entry 
for science). 
148. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (without date, 1780), in FAMILIAR LETTERS, 
supra note 135 (emphasis added). 
149. ld. 
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expanding fields of study. 150 He recognized that the result of refining 
existent branches of study is the creation of more branches. 151 And 
that idea appears to be present in the singular form of Science. 152 
Thus, the Framers appear to have intended Science in the 
Copyright Clause to represent a system of knowledge comprising 
distinct branches of study. As discussed in the immediate preceding 
subsection, Science's meaning as distinct categories of knowledge or 
branches of study is apparent from the juxtaposition of Science and 
useful Arts. 153 As discussed in this subsection, Science's meaning as 
a system is apparent from its singular form that represents an 
abstraction of the entire set of branches of knowledge. 154 Science in 
the Copyright Clause therefore represents a system of knowledge 
comprising, or derived from, distinct branches of study. 
D. Post-Constitution Evidence 
Treatment of copyright law following the Constitutional 
Convention further suggests this meaning of Science. Distinct pieces 
of evidence during this time period suggest the understanding of the 
general public, a member of the Supreme Court, and Congress. 155 
This Section discusses that evidence. 
1. The public understanding 
Perhaps the most valuable evidence regarding the original 
meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause consists of that which 
suggests the public's understanding. The prevailing approach to an 
original textual analysis of the Constitution examines the meanings 
of words from the perspective of the political and linguistic 
community that adopted them as law. 156 Under this approach, a 
word's public meaning at the time of the Framing is the most 
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
152. This characteristic of evolving branches of study in the system of Science suggests 
that the system contemplates mere attempts at establishing a branch of knowledge, even if those 
attempts are unsuccessful. 
153. See discussion supra Part Ill. C. I. 
154. See discussion supra Part lii.C.2. 
155. See discussion infra Part Ili.D.l-3. 
156. See generally sources cited supra note 68. 
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persuasive evidence of its meaning in the Constitution. 157 Hence, 
evidence of the public's understanding of either science generally, or 
more relevantly, Science in the Copyright Clause, is valuable in 
arriving at an originalist understanding of Science. 
One key piece of evidence surrounding the public's 
understanding of Science in the Clause consists in the sort of 
material that the public initially registered for copyright protection 
following the Constitutional Convention. 158 In the decade following 
ratification of the Constitution, federal courts kept records of the 
sorts of works that the public registered for copyright protection. 159 
Of course these registered works do not conclusively prove any 
meaning of Science; they support a meaning only to the extent 
registrants believed that their works would promote the Progress of 
Science. This assumption cannot be definitively established. 
Nevertheless, the sorts of works do share commonality, and that fact 
supports an inference regarding the public understanding of Science. 
157. See Konig, supra note 68, at 1301-07 (describing his interpretive textual analysis as 
original public meaning rather than original intent of the Framers); Sacharoff, supra note 68, at 
323 n.143 (explaining distinction between original intent and original public meaning). 
158. Dictionaries of the time would of course inform the public understanding of Science 
at the Framing. Yet as discussed above, dictionaries of the time-like Dr. johnson's Dictionary-
did not arrange meanings by public usage patterns. See discussion supra Part 1l.B.l. Nor did they 
specify whether the entries retlected actual usage as opposed to purported proper usage. Their 
value is therefore limited in determining the most common public understanding of Science. 
Dictionaries, however, do not represent the only means for tracking public usage patterns 
of words. The field of corpus linguistics offers resources to word usage patterns in the past two 
centuries. Corpus linguistics is a methodology that analyzes the use of language through various 
sources compiled in an electronic database called a corpus. See Mouritsen, supra note 39, at 1954. 
The Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) represents the largest freely-available 
corpus of the English language. See CORPUS OF HIST. AM. ENG. (COHA), 
http://corpus.byu.edu/coha/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). It processes data that is available on 
Coogle Books, although its resources do not extend back to the decade of the Framing. See id. 
When searching for the use of science during the 181 Os and 1820s, COHA reveals that 
the most commonly used three-word phrase (in Coogle Books) that includes the word science is 
the phrase, "the science of." See id. No other three-word phrase was even half as commonly used. 
See id. This data indicates that a few decades after the Framing, "the science of" was a common 
phrase. And the phrase "the science of' indicates that the next word or phrase will represent a 
particular field of study. Therefore, the prevalence of "the science of' suggests that a common 
public understanding of science related to particular fields of study. COHA supports the 
conclusion that a few the decades after the Constitutional Convention, science was commonly 
found in a phrase indicating field of study. See id. 
159. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xxii. 
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Before examining those works, it is important to note that the 
registration process under the 1790 Act did not involve any 
governmental entity endorsin~ the registration. 160 Unlike the 
registration process of today, 1 1 under the 1 790 Act an author 
merely filed a record at a local federal district court without any 
governmental endorsement of the registration. 162 The subjects of 
registration were not screened for content-although their content 
could be challenged after registration. 163 Thus, coupled with this 
background, the types of works registered at the time suggest, but 
do not establish, a public understanding of the sorts of works that 
copyright would protect. 
Copyright registration records are available for the decade 
between 1790 and 1800. 164 Two scholars, James Gilreath and 
Elizabeth Carter Wills, performed a detailed examination of federal 
copyright records from that period. Gilreath observed a great 
imbalance in the types of works registered. 165 Regarding "serious 
imaginative works," Gilreath noted that only a handful were 
registered. 166 
By contrast, practical or commercially useful books constituted a 
majority of those registered. 167 Textbooks, manuals, geographical 
atlases, and commercial directories were common. 168 Interestingly, 
although such practical works constituted a high proportion of 
registered material, they did not reflect the same proportion of 
printed work of the time. 169 Imaginative works were noticeably 
underrepresented in the federal registration records. 170 On the other 
hand, imaginative works were well represented in state registration 
records. 171 These observations suggest an understanding that federal 
160. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (1790). 
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2006). 
162. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xxii. 
163. See, e.g., Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872) 
(challenging copyright based on content of material). 
164. See FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS, supra note 17, at xxii. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. ("[A] larger proportion of state copyright registrations than federal 
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copyright of that time did not extend to any subject matter, but 
rather only those subjects which were instructional or associated 
with specific branches of study. 
2. A Supreme Court justice 
During the contemporary period of the Framers, there is no 
record of any judicial opinion that examines the meaning of Science 
in the Copyright Clause. There is, however, such an opinion that was 
written in 1829 soon after most of the Framers had died. 172 The 
1829 case, Clayton v. Stone, was written by Supreme Court Justice 
Smith Thompson, who was a young contemporary of the 
Framers. 173Justice Thompson sat by designation as a Circuit Justice 
for the federal court in the Southern District of New York, hearing 
the Clayton case. 174 Clayton raised the issue of whether a price-
current-a weekly publication of market prices-was copyrightable 
in view of the restricting term, Science, in the Copyright Clause. 175 
Justice Thompson denied protection for the price-current on the 
grounds that it did not satisfy the meaning of Science. 176 He 
explained that because Congress passed the 1 790 Copyright Act in 
execution of its power under the Copyright Clause, that Act's object 
was necessarily to promote Science and that the price-current did not 
do so. 177 In his words: 
[I]t would certainly be a pretty extraordinary view of the sciences to 
consider a daily or weekly publication of the state of the market as 
registrations were for imaginative works."). 
172. See Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872). 
173. See id. at 1000. See also Gerald T. Dunne, Smith Thompson, in 1 THE jUSTICES OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 475 (Leon 
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). 
174. See Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 999. 
175. Id. at 1003. 
176. !d. Setting aside the question of whether the price-current complies with the original 
meaning of Science, it may or may not have been deemed to constitute copyrightable subject 
matter under modern copyright jurisprudence. On the one hand, the market prices would seem 
to reflect facts that are not copyrightable under Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 344-45 (1991). On the other hand, catalogues that have estimated prices have been viewed 
as statements of opinion, rather than fact, and therefore copyrightable. See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. 
v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1994). 
177. Clayton, 5 F. Cas. at 1003. Justice Thompson impliedly distinguished useful Arts from 
Science here. See id. 
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falling within any class of them. They are of a more fixed, 
permanent and durable character. The term science cannot, with any 
propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating and fugitive a form 
as that of a newspaper or price current, the subject-matter of which 
is daily changing, and is of mere temporary use. 178 
Justice Thompson thus considered Science to reflect subjects that 
were "fixed, permanent and durable." 179 He expressly opined that 
Science could not apply to works that were "fluctuating and 
fugitive," "daily changing," or of "mere temporary use." 180 His 
interpretation of Science suggests an established field of study, 
precluding Science as general knowledge. 181 
Also notable about Justice Thompson's opinion is that he 
recognized that public utility of a price-current, as well as the 
diligent labor that it took to produce it, does not give rise to 
copyright ~rotection absent a connection with "learning and the 
sciences."1 2 Science as a fixed, permanent, and durable subject is 
necessary for protection regardless of whether the expression is 
valuable according to some other means of measurement, so taught 
Justice Thompson. 183 Thus, the respected judicial contemporary of 
the Framers, Justice Smith Thompson, understood Science as 
requiring works to have a purpose that served an established branch 
of study. 184 
178. Id. (emphasis added). 
179. Id. 
180. Jd. 
181. See id. 
182. In justice Thompson's words: 
Although great praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in 
publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being rewarded in this 
way; it must seek patronage and protection from its utility to the public and not as a 
work of science. The title of the act of congress is ("]for the encouragement of 
learning,["] and was not intended for the encouragement of mere industry, 
unconnected with learning and the sciences. 
Jd. (citation omitted). 
183. See id. 
184. See id. 
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3. The 1 790 Congress 
Congress enacted the first federal copyright statute in 1790. 185 
That 1790 Act might be interpreted as indicating an original 
understanding of the Copyright Clause given the Act's close 
proximity to the ratification of the Constitution. 186 And although 
the Act does not specifically define Science, it provides evidence of 
its meanin~ in its stated purpose: "the Encouragement of 
Learning." 18 Important here is the meaning of Learning. Learning did 
not mean the acquisition of any information at all. Rather, learning 
suggested the acquisition of information related to either scholastic 
knowledge or some sort of skill. 188 Dr. Johnson's Dictionary defines 
learning as: 
Literature; skill in languages or sciences; generally 
Scholastick knowledge. 
Skill in any thing good or bad. 189 
The first definition suggests either a skill or scholastic 
knowledge. 190 Likewise, the second definition implies some sort of a 
skill. Skill suggests an aptitude or ability; 191 scholastic knowledge 
suggests an acquisition of educational information. 192 Both imply 
185. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
186. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) ("The 
construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790, and the act of 1802, by the 
men who were contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of the 
convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight .... "). 
187. The full title of the 1790 Copyright Act reads: "An Act for the encouragement of 
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of 
such copies, during the times therein mentioned." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. IS, 1 Stat. 124. See 
1790 Federal Copyright Act in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS, supra note 81, at 22. 
188. See jOHNSON, supra note 11 (unpaginated). 
189. Id. 
190. johnson defines literature as "learning; skill in letters." !d. 
191. See 15 OED, supra note 114, at 603 (defining skill as, inter alia, "[c]apability of 
accomplishing something with precision and certainty; practical knowledge in combination with 
ability; clerverness, exepertness .... [A]n ability to perform a function, acquired or learnt with 
practice"). 
192. See 14 OED, supra note 114, at 630 (defining scholastic as, inter alia, "studious, 
learned;" "[h]aving the characteristics of the scholar or student, as distinguished from the man 
of affairs"); 8 OED, supra note 114, at 517 (defining knowledge as, inter alia, "[a]cquaintance 
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meanings narrower than mere acquisition of any sort of information. 
Hence, the title of the 1790 Copyright Act, "An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning," suggests the purpose of copyright as 
encouraging skills or scholastic knowledge. It does not suggest a 
purpose of encouraging the production of any and all information. 
IV. THE MEANING OF SCIENCE RESTORED 
As discussed above, Science in the Copyright Clause did not 
mean general knowledge of anything. 193 The modern interpretation 
of the original meaning is simply incorrect. Science connoted a 
system of knowledge that derives from branches of study. 194 It 
represented subjects that were worthy of study. At first glance, this 
more accurate understanding of Science might suggest that the scope 
of copyright law should be limited to educational material. If Science 
limits the scope of copyright to material that relates to subjects of 
study, it could be argued that copyright should be limited to material 
with a scholastic purpose. That interpretation, however, I do not 
propose. I propose that Science should preclude only expression that 
would fail to receive protection under the Free Speech Clause. That 
proposal and potential objections are discussed below. 
A. An Interpretation that Excludes Unprotected Speech 
As a system of knowledge, Science in the Copyright Clause 
encompassed a broad array of subjects in a vast range of settings. 195 
Science was growing and expanding, ever changing both in subject 
matter and means of study. 196 That flexibility should control its 
application today. Science should recognize the explosion of fields 
that society now considers worthy of study. It should extend beyond 
the formal classroom, contemplating studies of culture, customs, and 
opinion. For instance, much of today's entertainment may be seen as 
providing valuable insight about human behavior. Hence, my 
proposal for applying a more accurate meaning of Science would 
with a branch of learning, a language, or the like; theoretical or practical understanding of an art, 
science, industry, etc."). 
193. See discussion supra Part III. 
194. See discussion supra Part III. 
195. See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
196. See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
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preserve copyright protection for most expression that now enjoys 
that protection. Most expression may be viewed as an illustration of 
that which merits study. Flexible application of the original meaning 
of Science to modern culture suggests that copyright should 
encompass a broad array of expression. 
This conclusion immediately raises the question of whether the 
more accurate interpretation of Science discussed in this Article 
would change anything in copyright law. Other than an academic 
exercise in history, would a more accurate understanding of the 
original meaning of Science affect the scope of copyright protection? 
What difference would it make? The answer to this question is that 
the more accurate understanding of Science should discriminate 
against at least a small group of expression that presently does 
receive copyright protection. Although most expression should fit 
comfortably within a flexible interpretation of the original meaning 
of Science, this should not hold for all expression. No matter how 
flexible Science might be construed, if Science represents a system of 
knowledge that derives from branches of study, Science should 
discriminate against that which, by definition, is not a part of-and 
indeed may be harmful to-that system. I propose that one distinct 
group of expression should categorically fall outside the meaning of 
Science-namely, expression that fails to receive protection under 
the Free Speech Clause. 197 
By definition, unprotected speech under the Free Speech Clause 
lacks sufficient social value to protect it from censorship. 198 
Censorship is condoned because value is absent. And that absence of 
value under free speech doctrine implies the absence of value in the 
system of knowledge that comprises branches of study, i.e., Science. 
Expression that lacks value sufficient to receive protection as speech 
197. In another work, I contemplate whether Science (or the Progress Clause) should 
discriminate against one other category of works-those which are harmful to society yet 
protected by the Free Speech Clause. See Snow, supra note 42. 
198. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements 
of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the 
marketplace of ideas .... ");Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscenity 
as expression that "lacks serious literary, artistic, political. or scientific value"); Chaplinsky v. 
State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (recognizing that unprotected 
expressions "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality"). 
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necessarily fails to augment a branch of study that would further 
Science's system of knowledge. Moreover, much unprotected speech 
results in various harms to society, and those harms arguably detract 
from Science's system of knowledge-the sort of system that is 
worthy of study and promotion. 199 Therefore, content that lacks 
value as protectable speech, and indeed often causes harm to society, 
must lack value as promotable Science. I thus propose that courts 
should preclude copyright protection of unprotected speech under 
the more accurate meaning of Science. 
By withholding the monopoly of copyright from obscenity, libel, 
and expression that incites imminent lawless action, there would to 
a certain extent be a reduction of that expression. The absence of 
profit reduces the incentive to create and distribute. If, however, 
such expression does exist, and its creator claims a copyright, a 
defendant who allegedly violates one of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright may argue an affirmative defense200 to infringement based 
on its status as unprotected speech.201 That affirmative defense 
would require the defendant to prove that the expression constitutes 
unprotected speech, consistent with the established tenant of First 
Amendment law that requires the party seeking to silence a speaker 
to show that the disputed speech is unprotected.202 If the defendant 
199. Harms may be overt, such as those which result from child pornography. See New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (observing the physiological, emotional, and mental 
harm that results from child pornography). They may also be subtle but nevertheless damaging. 
For example, Miller-standard obscenity or false defamatory publications may harm human 
dignity or reputational interests. See generally Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright I.aw 
2.0, 10 VAND.]. ENT. & TECH. L. 799, 817-20 (2008) (noting harms to females that result from 
pornography production). 
200. The defense would be an affirmative defense because it would apply only in the 
particular instance of the defendant's unauthorized use of the expression. Some unprotected 
speech, i.e., obscenity, requires a definition that is based on community standards, and as a 
result, the unprotected nature of the speech may vary across the country. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 
25. Accordingly, a finding that the author of unprotected speech does not receive copyright 
protection in one instance would not necessarily suggest such a finding in another instance. 
Unprotected speech would therefore constitute an affirmative defense that would not necessarily 
preclude, at least in the case of obscenity, copyright enforcement in different communities. 
201. For example, if a website copied and posted a libelous story from a newspaper, the 
website would not be liable for copyright infringement if it could establish the applicable 
elements for a libel cause of action against the newspaper. 
202. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) ("fllt is important to ensure not 
only that the substantive First Amendment standards are sound, but also that they are applied 
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makes that showing in the copyright suit, he would be excused from 
the consequences of having infringed.203 
Although this proposal would not affect most expression that 
presently receives copyright protection, it would affect a distinct 
group of expression that is tied to free speech doctrine. To be clear, 
my proposal requires free speech doctrine to define a distinct 
boundary of copyright. And this reliance on speech doctrine in 
copyright makes sense. The theoretical tie between the Free Speech 
Clause and the Copyright Clause is already recognized in the law. 
According to the Supreme Court, the Framers viewed copyright as 
the engine of free expression. 204 The Court has further recognized 
that copyright exists "to promote the creation and publication of free 
expression."205 Copyright represents the economic incentive for 
speech production, and in that way, copyright furthers the 
marketplace of ideas. Indeed, to the extent that the marketplace 
theory underlies the Free Speech Clause, it would also appear to 
underlie the Copyright Clause. The Free Speech Clause promotes 
ideas into the marketplace by ensuring the absence of government 
suppression of a speaker's speech, whereas the Copyright Clause 
promotes ideas into the marketplace by ensuring the presence of 
government suppression of a copier's speech. Both Clauses exist to 
promote the production of speech, which ultimately yields a more 
through reliable procedures. This is why we have often held . . . a particular allocation of the 
burden of proof ... to be constitutionally required in proceedings that may penalize protected 
speech."). Placing the burden on the defendant copier would help to ensure that copyright 
continue to incent speech at the margins of protection, thereby reducing an unwarranted 
chilling. 
203. As a practical matter, if the outcome of the copyright suit is a finding that the 
disputed expression does not receive copyright protection because it constitutes unprotected 
speech, neither the copyright holder nor the defendant likely would continue to disseminate the 
expression. Once the copyright action had determined the expression to be unprotected, legal 
actions designed to discourage the proliferation of unprotected speech-e.g., a defamation or 
obscenity suit-would be much more ripe for prosecution. 
204. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889-90 (2012) ("[T]he Framers regarded 
copyright protection not simply as a limit on the manner in which expressive works may be 
used. They also saw copyright as an engine of free expression: By establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.") (internal quotations omitted); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) 
("[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.") (quoting Harper 
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enter. Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). 
205. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (emphasis omitted). 
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fruitful marketplace. Thus, the purpose of copyright appears tightly 
aligned with the purpose of free speech.206 And their common 
purpose suggests a common limitation. That which limits speech 
production should apply at least as much in copyright as it does in 
free speech. 
B. Objections to the Interpretation 
Admittedly, this Article does not offer a comprehensive 
discussion on whether copyright should extend to expression that 
lacks protection under the Free Speech Clause.207 Much more could 
be said on this topic.208 In this Article I merely observe the 
206. Although the purposes of the Free Speech and Copyright Clauses align, there is an 
important distinction between the two Clauses. Textually, the scope of expression contemplated 
by the Copyright Clause appears narrower than that contemplated by the Free Speech Clause. 
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the 
Progress of Science .... ") with U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech"). The Copyright Clause sets forth a substantive standard for its 
invocation (promoting the Progress of Science) whereas the Free Speech Clause does not. And 
this makes sense. Whereas the Free Speech Clause precludes government interference against 
speech, the Copyright Clause facilitates a government-created monopoly for speech. Hence, 
under the Free Speech Clause, government merely refrains from interfering, whereas under the 
Copyright Clause, government actively facilitates. Resources necessary to refrain from 
interfering with speech would seem less costly than those required to create and maintain 
monopolies. Hence, it makes sense that the Copyright Clause would not cover as broad a group 
of speech as the Free Speech Clause. 
Whc<;1er Science restricts the Copyright Clause to less expression than that which the 
Free Speech Clause protects is a discussion for another day. For present purposes, it suffices to 
note that the presence of a term in the Copyright Clause that does not contemplate all 
expression (Science) implies that the Copyright Clause must be at least as restrictive as the Free 
Speech Clause, which lacks any such term. If both exist to produce speech, but only one contains 
a restrictive term, then the Clause with the restrictive term must be at least as restrictive as the 
Clause without that restriction. The Copyright Clause appears at least as restrictive as the Free 
Speech Clause-if not more so. 
207. Space limitations in an article that endeavors to set forth sufficient evidence to 
establish a reliable understanding of the original meaning of Science necessarily preclude a 
comprehensive discussion regarding whether unprotected speech should receive copyright 
protection. 
208. For a more comprehensive discussion regarding the policy question of whether 
obscenity, and indeed pornography generally, should receive copyright protection, see Ann 
Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 1-54 (2012) and Ann Bartow, supra note 
199, at 799-840. Professor Bartow argues that pornography lies "beyond the scope of the 
Intellectual Property Clause" on the grounds that pornography is "non-progressive and non-
useful." See Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, supra note 208, at 55. She does not, however, 
base her constitutional conclusion on the meaning of Science, instead relying on the 
conventional interpretation that Science means "knowledge." See id. at 37-38 & n.l80. 
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constitutional tension between the original meaning of Science and 
unprotected expression under the Free Speech Clause and I briefly 
suggest a proposal to relieve that tension. To that end, I summarily 
examine three possible objections to my proposal in this section: 
first, the proposal seems to produce greater uncertainty in copyright 
law; second, the proposal seems to require subjective views of judges 
and juries to determine copyrightable subject matter; and third, the 
proposal seems to yield a counterproductive result, the increased 
dissemination of unprotected speech. 
1. Uncertainty 
One objection to my proposal is that it would produce great 
uncertainty in copyright law. By importing the complexities of free 
speech doctrines into copyright, my proposal arguably muddies the 
alread~ murky doctrine of subject-matter eligibility in copyright 
law.20 The definition of unprotected speech is determined on a case-
by-case basis.210 It is anything but certain. Accordingly, defining 
copyright eligibility according to the free speech doctrine of 
unprotected speech would do nothing to clarify, and indeed might 
regress, the morass of confusion over subject-matter eligibility.211 So 
it would seem that importing doctrines of free speech into copyright 
would only import greater confusion into the law. 
My initial response to this objection is that any uncertainty that 
the proposal introduces into copyright would be relatively minimal. 
209. See infra note 21 1. 
210. See, e.g., McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 683 (1976) ("There can be no question 
that uncertainty inheres in the definition of obscenity."); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 
(1973) (applying community standards of jury to determine definition of obscenity); Alan E. 
Brownstein, Rules Of Engagement For Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and 
Protected Expression in Anti-abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 553, 624 n.140 (1996) ("Since 
the definitions adopted by courts to describe categories of unprotected speech are as ambiguous 
as they are, a generic ban will inevitably provide officials and juries considerable opportunity to 
pick and choose among the messages that arguably fall within the relevant prohibition."); Peter 
E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of United 
States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622, 1677-78 (1977) (commenting that juries may be 
influenced by political views in deciding whether speech is unprotected). 
21 1. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and Injunctions, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.]. 
11, 22 (2012) (recognizing the uncertainty in applying the subject-matter doctrine of idea-
expression dichotomy); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 683, 684-85 (2012) (noting the "confusion and incoherence" that has developed 
in defining the subject matter of copyright). 
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It would arise only where expression could be reasonably challenged 
as lacking protection under the Free Speech Clause. Only the 
arguably obscene or libelous would be subject to the uncertainty of 
whether they are in fact obscene or libelous. Most expression 
presently eligible for copyright protection would not be affected by 
my proposal. 
With regard to any uncertainty that Science would impose on 
arguably unprotected speech that is in fact protected, that 
uncertainty is not necessarily undesirable. This is because the 
uncertainty faced by authors of such expression would balance 
uncertainty faced by fair users. Users of copyrighted expression face 
uncertainty in assessing whether their use is permissible under the 
doctrines of fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy. 212 In 
choosing to make a fair use or to use an idea underlying expression, 
such users are exercising their speech right under the Free Speech 
Clause.213 And the vagueness of these doctrines creates uncertainty 
for those users as they attempt to bring their speech to the 
marketplace of ideas.214 In view of this fact, the uncertainty that 
some authors would face in assessing whether their works comply 
with the meaning of Science would balance the uncertainty that fair 
users now face in assessing whether their copying constitutes a fair 
use, or similarly, an unprotected idea. Science would therefore bring 
balance to existent uncertainty faced by only one side in copyright 
law.215 The balance would help ensure adequate breathing space 
necessary for copyright to promote free expression. 
212. See Pierre N. Leva!, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 
(1990) (describing the uncertainty surrounding fair use and the resulting reluctance to employ 
it); joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 434 (2007) ("The 
chilling effect on creative [fair-use] expression has been well-documented. This is exacerbated 
by the tendency of copyright owners to take advantage of the uncertainty to pursue aggressive 
copyright claims."); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1483, 1497-98 (2007) (observing that vagueness of fair use deters permissible uses); Ned Snow, 
Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1789-91 (2010) 
(explaining uncertainty that inheres in fair use). 
213. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (explaining that the fair use and 
idea-expression doctrines in copyright constitute accommodations to satisfy First Amendment 
speech concerns). 
214. See sources cited supra note 212. 
215. Of course the uncertainty that copyright holders face would be much less 
consequential than the uncertainty faced by fair users: copyright holders would face the 
possibility that they would not receive a monopoly reward by misconstruing Science. whereas 
fair users would face the possibility of punitive-like financial penalties by misconstruing fairness. 
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2. Subjective judicial assessment 
A second objection to my proposal is that it would require judges 
to impose their subjective beliefs in defining the proper subject 
matter of copyright. Under my proposal, judges (or juries) would 
define permissible content of copyright based upon their 
understanding of whether speech is protectable under the Free 
Speech Clause. Arguably this outcome might raise concern given the 
warning that Justice Holmes pronounces in Bleistein v. Donaldson: "It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the 
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."216 
Doesn't my proposal require judges to be the final arbiters of 
expression? 
I respond to this objection by first affirming my agreement with 
Justice Holmes's admonition. For this reason I argue above that 
Science should be interpreted liberally so as to give place for various 
works of entertainment that at first glance might not seem to 
promote any branch of study.217 Nevertheless, the nondiscrimination 
principle that Holmes preached was not absolute.218 It included a 
limitation.219 Holmes recognized that content evaluation is indeed 
necessary in "the narrowest and most obvious" of cases.220 And if 
any sort of expression represents such a narrow and obvious limit on 
copyrightable content, it must be expression that the Free Speech 
Clause deems worthy of censorship. Holmes's warning against 
content evaluation in copyright law is entirely consistent with 
Science as a term that discriminates against content that a judge or 
jury deems unprotected speech. Expression that lacks so much value, 
to the extent that the law damns it as unprotected speech, represents 
the narrowest and most obvious of limits on the nondiscrimination 
principle. My proposal is therefore consistent with Justice Holmes's 
admonition.~21 
216. 188 u.s. 239, 251 (1903). 
217. See discussion supra Part IV (arguing that Science should be flexibly applied in the 
Copyright Clause). 
218. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. 
221. In another article, I analyze the history surrounding the Progress Clause leading up to 
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3. Counterproductive result 
A third objection to my proposal is that it might encourage the 
production of expression that does not promote Science-i.e., 
unprotected speech. Without a copyright monopoly, unprotected 
speech could be freely copied. The absence of any government-
backed monopoly might therefore encourage the proliferation of that 
which Science deems unworthy of promotion. 
My initial response to this objection is that it questions the 
fundamental premise underlying copyright law-i.e., that a 
monopoly of expression will incentivize more and better expression. 
The objection assumes that absent a copyright monopoly on 
unprotected speech, unprotected speech would proliferate. If this 
were true, it implies that absent copyright monopoly on any sort of 
speech, that speech would proliferate. And if that were true, there 
seems no cause for copyright in the first place. So as an initial 
matter, I note the doubtful premise of the objection-i.e., that 
copyright does not work.222 
On the merits of the objection, even if it is true that the 
dissemination of unprotected speech would increase under my 
proposal, this does not represent a reason to misconstrue Science. 
Science in the Copyright Clause serves to incent certain sorts of 
works through a government-created monopoly system. Yet limited 
are government resources to maintain that monopoly system. 
Science therefore allocates the limited resources that are necessary to 
create and maintain legal monopolies. 223 It discriminates against 
unprotected speech in its resource allocation of copyright.224 That is 
and following Bleistein v. Donaldson, in order to demonstrate that Justice Holmes's articulation of 
the nondiscrimination principle did not affect the non-copyrightable nature of works that were 
obscene, libelous, or otherwise unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. See Snow, supra note 42. 
222. See Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, supra note 208, at 38-39 (responding to 
economic argument of wider dissemination for unprotected, harmful works by arguing that 
benefits of precluding future harm outweigh costs of dissemination of existent works). 
223. Cf In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (upholding Congressional 
choice to refrain from granting trademark protection to "scandalous" marks under 15 U.S.C. § 
1052 (a) on ground that Congress permissibly exercised its judgment regarding expenditure of 
public funds to maintain the costly monopoly system of trademark). 
224. Cf. Devil Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Once 
a court has determined that copyrighted material is obscene, there seems no reason to require it 
to expend its resources on behalf of a plaintiff who it could as readily be trying for a violation of 
the federal criminal law."). 
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all that matters. If unprotected expression proliferates as a result of 
the allocation of resources, that fact should not affect the allocation. 
C. Test Case 
Although most modern courts and commentators have settled on 
an anachronistic meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, the 
issue is very much alive. A recent case filed in the Northern District 
of California, Wong v. Hard Drive Productions, Inc., illustrates this 
point.225 The plaintiff, Liuxia Wong, sought a declaratory judgment 
against Hard Drive Productions, Inc. (HDP), stating that she was not 
infringin~ on its copyright by allegedly downloading pornographic 
images.2 6 Wong argued that HDP did not have a coEyright in the 
images at issue because they constituted obscenity. 27 Ultimately 
she prevailed, but the record provided only a one-sentence 
judgment.228 There was no opinion to guide future litigants.229 
Although I believe the judgment was correct, an opinion is 
necessary. 230 I therefore provide a brief analysis for the opinion that 
the court should have issued in the Wong case. As I discuss below, 
the judgment should have turned on the meaning of Science in the 
Copyright Clause. 
The issue in Wong calls into question a 1979 decision by the 
Fifth Circuit, Mitchell Brothers v. Cinema Adult Theater, addressing 
whether obscene works are copyrightable.231 The Mitchell court 
provided an opinion that defended the copyrightability of obscene 
225. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 10-11, Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 
No. 5-12-cv-00469-HRL (N.D. Cal. jan. 31, 2012). 
226. !d. 
227. Id. 
228. See Stipulated judgment, Wong, No. 4-12-cv-00469-YGR (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2012). 
229. See id. 
230. The necessity of an opinion that clarifies this issue is further evident by judicial 
uncertainty over whether copyright applies to obscene, or even pornographic but not legally 
obscene, material. See Devil Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
("It is far from clear that the Second Circuit will follow the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in rejecting 
the argument that obscene material is entitled to copyright protection."); Liberty Media 
Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 n.2 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(questioning whether legal hard-core pornography is copyrightable, while refraining from 
deciding the issue). 
231. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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works. 232 Although other courts have followed Mitchell, those other 
courts have provided minimal analysis on the issue. 233 Mitchell thus 
stands as the seminal case for copyrighting obscenity, and by 
implication, unprotected speech generally.234 Hence, a well-reasoned 
opinion in Wong should address the points raised in Mitchell. 
Fundamental to the Mitchell court's conclusion that obscenity is 
copyrightable was its interpretation of the Copyright Clause.235 The 
court interpreted the purpose of the Clause as promoting creativity 
and originality, consistent with an understanding of Science as 
promoting general knowledge. 236 Creating anything gives rise to 
knowledge of something, so even obscenity would fulfill Science's 
apparent requirement of creativity-so reasoned the court.237 In 
short, the anachronistic meaning of Science enabled the Mitchell 
court to extend copyri~ht protection to an unprotected form of 
speech, legal obscenity.2 8 
The flaw of Mitchell lies in the court's explanation that the 
purpose of the Copyright Clause is to promote creativity rather than 
to promote Science.239 Only if Science were to mean general 
knowledge would creativity work as the purpose of copyright. But 
Science does not mean general knowledge. It means the system of 
knowledge that comprises branches of study. The correct 
232. Id. 
233. See, e.g., Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 404~05 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on 
Mitchell to uphold copyright in obscenity); Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Nos. 02 Civ. 
3850(HB), 02 (Civ. 6277(HB), 03 Civ. 3379(HB), 2004 WL 2754685, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 
2004) (same). 
234. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 49, § 2.17 at 2-197 (describing the court's reasoning in 
Mitchell as "the most thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the [copyrighting obscenity] 
issue"). 
235. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 856, 860 (5th 
Cir. 1979). 
236. See id. 
237. See id. 
238. It is well recognized that the Authors and Writings terms of the Copyright Clause 
require expression to exhibit originality or creativity to be copyrighted. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). Those terms, however, do not imply that the purpose of the 
Copyright Clause is to promote creativity. They do not imply that Science means creativity. 
239. Other flaws appeared in the reasoning of the Mitchell court, including its reliance on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supreme Court decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). For an analysis of these flawed aspects of Mitchell, see 
Snow, supra note 42. 
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interpretation of Science would have changed the court's analysis. 
Rather than asking whether obscenity promotes creativity, the 
Mitchell court should have asked whether obscenity promotes the 
system of knowledge that comprises branches of study. It should 
have asked whether society deems obscenity worthy of study. And as 
unprotected speech, obscenity could not have been construed as a 
subject worthy of study, much less worthy of promotion or even 
protection. Under the correct interpretation of Science, Mitchell 
should have been decided differently. Accordingly, Wong should have 
corrected the reasoning of Mitchell by holding that Science precludes 
copyrighting obscenity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has established the paucity of historical support for 
construing Science in the Copyright Clause as general knowledge or 
learning. The evidence suggests a narrower meaning, i.e., a system of 
knowledge deriving from branches of study. And that meaning 
suggests that Science does not contemplate all content. Content that 
is so far removed from the system of study should not fall within the 
meaning of Science, and thereby should fall outside the scope of 
copyright. 
The meaning of Science revealed, courts must either apply it or 
account for ignoring it. If they continue to apply it, expression falling 
outside the Free Speech Clause should not receive copyright 
protection. Courts must recognize that unprotected speech lacks the 
value that is necessary for expression to promote the system of 
knowledge comprising fields of study. What should not be protected 
should not be promoted. Science does not contemplate all 
expression. 
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